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David Attewell: Redistribution Attitudes and Socio-Structural Conflict in Postindustrial Europe 




A growing vein of scholarship argues that redistribution attitudes are rooted not only in 
economic self-interest, but also in perceptions about the deservingness of those receiving help, an 
arena in which social affinity and status judgments loom large (Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and 
Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). This dissertation applies recent theoretical and methodological 
advances to reexamine redistributive conflict and its consequences for the social bases of partisan 
divides in Europe.  
The first paper offers a new perspective on the ideological underpinnings of voting 
behavior in Europe. In varying degrees and combinations, I find preferences about the scope of the 
welfare state and perceptions of the deservingness of benefit recipients predict vote choice not only 
for longstanding parties, but also for green and radical right parties traditionally associated with 
the rising salience of socio-cultural issues. The second paper examines how deservingness 
perceptions and welfare state support relate to the education cleavage in electoral politics. Political 
economy perspectives of education as a labor market asset imply different effects on redistributive 
preferences than sociological and psychological views of education as a source of status 
(in)security associated with the propensity to draw or reject harsh boundaries against benefit 
recipients. Mediation analyses suggest the negative (positive) deservingness perceptions of those 
with low (high) education help to explain why radical right and green voters represent the poles of 
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the education cleavage. Finally, a third (co-authored) paper offers fresh evidence about the nature 
of the gender gap in redistribution attitudes. Our results suggest women are more supportive of an 
expansive welfare state than men, but do not perceive the needy as more deserving. This implies 
that the gender gap is not the result of differences in empathy produced by gendered socialization. 
However, differences in welfare state support cannot be attributed to simple self-interest either. 
The gender gap emerges and widens only at the middle and higher ends of the economic 
distribution, where affluent men’s attitudes towards the welfare state become sharply more 
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The landscape of “frozen” cleavages of class and religion described by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) has changed dramatically. The dense associational networks that tied much of the 
organized working class to socialist parties or Catholics to Christian Democratic parties have 
declined in the face of decades of heightened mobility, both of people and capital. In recent 
years, parties of the center-left and center-right, dominant for much of the 20th century, have 
weakened or even collapsed as new challenger parties have emerged (Hobolt & Tilley 2016; de 
Vries & Hobolt 2020; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos 2020).  
Yet despite these dramatic changes, politics today nevertheless remain sharply defined by 
conflict between structurally-rooted social groups (Langsæther & Stubager 2019; Bornschier et 
al. 2021). Recent elections from across the developed world reveal stark political divides 
between people with high and low education, production workers and managers, and men and 
women. Yet these groups are in motion. University graduates, who in the early postwar period 
would once have been reliable conservatives, now form an increasingly central constituency of 
parties of the left. Meanwhile, many less-educated blue-collar workers have fled social 
democratic and radical left parties for parties of the far right, particularly those not organized in 
trade unions (Houtman et al. 2008; Piketty 2018; Mosimann et al. 2019). 
The rise of new conflicts over immigration and supranational identity are certainly a key 
part of the story (Kriesi et al. 2008; Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2018). 
Yet rising inequality, economic crises, and the emergence of new social risks mean that 
redistributive conflicts remain highly salient. The politics of redistribution are rooted both in 
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economic self-interest and in beliefs about the deservingness of those receiving help, an arena in 
which status judgments and social solidarities loom large (Van Oorschot 2006; Cavaillé 2014; 
Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). Theoretical frameworks which distinguish between self-
oriented and other-oriented redistribution attitudes offer a more fine-grained lens with which to 
understand and interpret changes in the socio-structural and ideological bases of political 
behavior in Europe.     
The first paper examines the relationship between preferences about the scope of the 
welfare state, perceptions of the deservingness of benefit recipients, and voting behavior. I find 
that the effects of one or both of these subdimensions of redistribution attitudes are strongly 
associated with vote choice. This is true not only for the longstanding parties that historically 
built and competed over the shape of European welfare states, but also for green and radical right 
parties traditionally associated in the literature with the rising salience of socio-cultural issues.  
The second paper examines how deservingness perceptions and welfare state support 
relate to the education cleavage in electoral politics. A political economy perspective which 
defines education as a labor market asset implies different effects on redistributive preferences 
from sociological and psychological conceptions of education, which see education as a source 
of status (in)security associated with the propensity to draw or reject harsh boundaries against 
benefit recipients. Both views find empirical support: education is negatively associated with 
support for an expansive welfare state, but positively associated with perceptions of the needy as 
deserving. Further mediation analyses suggest the negative (positive) deservingness perceptions 
of those with low (high) education help to explain why radical right and green voters represent 
the poles of the education cleavage.  
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Finally, a third paper (co-authored with Andreas Jozwiak and Kaitlin Alper) uses this 
multidimensional framework to offer fresh evidence about the nature of the gender gap in 
redistribution attitudes. Our results suggest women are more supportive of an expansive welfare 
state than men, but do not perceive the needy as more deserving. This implies that the gender gap 
is not the result of differences in empathy produced by gendered socialization. However, 
differences in welfare state support cannot be attributed to simple self-interest either. The gender 
gap only emerges and widens at the middle and higher ends of the economic distribution, where 



























CHAPTER 1: DESERVINGNESS PERCEPTIONS, WELFARE STATE SUPPORT, AND 




Scholars have argued that the rising vote share of green and radical right2 parties and the 
weakening of longstanding party families in Europe indicate the declining relevance of attitudes 
on the economic dimension for voters and the rising importance of immigration, supranational 
integration, and post-materialist values for vote choice (Bornschier 2009; De Vries 2018; 
Hooghe and Marks 2018; Inglehart 1977; Kriesi 1998). These latter issues form a socio-cultural 
dimension seen by most researchers as orthogonal to the older economic left/right.3 Green and 
radical right parties, competitors on the so-called “transnational cleavage”, emphasize their 
distinctive and extreme positions on immigration and the EU, while having indistinct or 
moderate positions on the redistributive dimension (Rovny 2012; Rovny 2013; Hooghe & Marks 
 
1 This is the authors accepted manuscript of an article published as the version of record in West European Politics© 
11 February 2020 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1715704. This article has benefited from comments from 
many colleagues to whom I express my deepest gratitude. First, thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Rahsaan 
Maxwell, Marc Hetherington, Jan Rovny, Leah Christiani, Andreas Jozwiak, Lucy Britt, Eroll Kuhn, Ted 
Enamorado and Kaitlin Alper for their valuable suggestions. Second, thanks to the participants of the May 3–4 2019 
Partisan Divides Workshop at UNC Chapel Hill, and particularly Sara Hobolt in her capacity as discussant, for their 
helpful comments. Finally, I thank two anonymous reviewers and editors of West European Politics for their 
thoughtful and constructive input throughout the review process. 
 
2 Scholars have used several different labels to describe this party family, including populist right, far right, and 
Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (see Golder 2016, 481-82). I use the term radical right because it is the 
most commonly used in the field.  
 
3 The division in values between opponents and supporters of transnationalism is expressed in a new dimension of 
political conflict which scholars use different labels to capture, but which are conceptually similar: post-materialism 
(Inglehart 1977), cosmopolitanism vs. parochialism (De Vries 2018), particularism vs. universalism (Häusermann and 
Kriesi 2015), libertarianism vs. authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1988), the group dimension (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014), 
demarcation vs. integration (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008) or Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) vs. 
Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).       
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2018; Rovny and Polk 2020). Mainstream parties defined by older class and religious cleavages, 
meanwhile, display the opposite pattern (Hooghe & Marks 2018).  
This paper argues, on the contrary, that voters remain strongly motivated by redistributive 
conflict, including those who support radical right and green parties. This diverges from 
arguments that green and radical right voters are defined by their attitudes on the “non-
economic” dimension (e.g. Flanagan & Lee 2003; Inglehart & Norris 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Stubager 2009). This is not to say that economic and socio-cultural conflicts are entirely 
separate. Indeed, this paper argues that moral judgments of the needy are a crucial aspect of 
political conflict over redistribution. However, thinking of deservingness as part of an economic 
dimension highlights that these “other-oriented” redistribution attitudes are not reducible to 
attitudes towards immigrants or supranational authority which conventionally characterize the 
socio-cultural dimension.  
This paper builds on Cavaillé & Trump (2015) in arguing that attitudes towards 
redistribution can be broken into two distinct subdimensions. The first concerns support for the 
welfare state and inequality reduction. The second concerns perceptions of the deservingness of 
welfare state beneficiaries. These are not the same; indeed, voters can and sometimes do support 
an expansive welfare state while having a dim view of the deservingness of benefit recipients 
and vice versa.4 Applying this two-dimensional framework of redistribution attitudes to a cross-
national analysis of vote choice, I demonstrate that, in combination, attitudes on each of these 
 
4 In a particularly illustrative example, Bullock (1999) finds that poor American benefit recipients were themselves 
more likely than middle class respondents to support the claim that welfare recipients are lazy or dishonest, while 
opposing cuts to welfare and maintaining that welfare programs themselves were socially legitimate. Middle class 
recipients, meanwhile, were less likely to make negative character judgements about the poor but more likely to 
support cuts and reject the legitimacy of welfare programs in the first place.  
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subdimensions predict vote choice for different party families. To my knowledge, this is the first 
application of said framework to explaining vote choice in a cross-national context. 
Using 2016 European Social Survey data for 15 Western European countries, I find that 
voting for green and radical right parties is strongly influenced by the perceived deservingness of 
benefit recipients. Those who see recipients as undeserving are substantially more likely to vote 
for radical right parties, while the opposite is true for those voting for green parties. This effect 
holds even controlling for voters’ positions on other issues like immigration and European 
integration, traditionally identified in the literature as central issues for their electorates. Support 
or opposition to an expansive welfare state, however, is not statistically significantly related to 
the probability of voting for either party.  
Voters for radical left and social democratic parties are more likely to favor a more 
expansive welfare state and stronger state action to reduce inequality, while liberal and 
conservative voters are more likely to support a smaller state and be more tolerant of inequality. 
For these established party families, positions on the welfare state and inequality and perceptions 
of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries both predict the probability of voting for the 
party in similar ways. 
  Rather than being eclipsed by other conflicts or salient only to a shrinking subset of 
voters, redistribution remains relevant for vote choice for both emerging and established party 
families. This multi-dimensional analysis suggests that the contemporary landscape is one in 
which voters’ choices of particular party families are associated with different combinations of 






Unpacking the economic left/right 
Though different in important respects, literature in both the realignment and neo-
cleavage traditions emphasizes that the rise of radical right and green parties is rooted primarily 
in their appeals on socio-cultural issues, rather than the issues of redistribution that distinguish 
older party families of the left and right (Bornschier 2010; De Vries 2018; Dolezal 2010; Hooghe 
and Marks 2018; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2009).  
However, many scholars have drawn attention to the rising political resonance of welfare 
chauvinism: support for a stronger welfare state, but with benefits and services restricted to 
natives rather than immigrants (Emmeneger and Klemmensen 2013; Magni 2018a; Magni 2020; 
Mews and Mau 2014; Van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman 2010). Welfare chauvinism 
implies a blending of economic and cultural issues, as individuals’ positions on the welfare state 
are filtered through their perceptions of immigrants as potential competitors for resources.  
Beyond purely ethnic motivations, a different approach argues that ‘other-oriented’ 
considerations centered around social affinity with recipients or negative character judgments of 
perceived ‘freeloaders’ also shape attitudes towards redistribution (Achterberg, Houtman, & 
Derks 2011; Achterberg, Van Der Veen & Raven 2013; Bloemraad et al. 2019; Cavaillé 2014; 
Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Houtman, Achterberg & Derks 2008; Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 64-
68).5 These affinities are not limited to immigration status or race, but also imply divisions 
rooted in class, education, social status, and geography.      
In evaluating contemporary redistributive attitudes, then, there are conceptual and 
empirical drawbacks to adopting a unidimensional view (Cavaillé & Trump 2015; Gingrich & 
Häusermann 2015; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Roosma, Gelissen & Van Oorschot 2013). 
 
5 Still other contributions in the literature on “other-oriented” motives for redistributive attitudes present a model of 
parochial altruism compatible both with theories rooted in welfare chauvinism or in other forms of status competition 
(Shayo 2009; Lupu & Pontusson 2011).  
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Cavaillé & Trump’s (2015) compelling theoretical framework divides attitudes towards 
redistribution into two different subdimensions. Attitudes about the deservingness of benefit 
recipients and those about the scope of the welfare state6 cluster distinctly from one another, and 
individuals evaluate them using different psychological mechanisms.  
Deservingness refers to perceptions that welfare state beneficiaries are or are not worthy 
of receiving public support and, relatedly, about whether or not receiving welfare state benefits 
and services undermine recipients’ sense of personal and social responsibility. In forming 
deservingness judgments, citizens consider the extent to which they identify and empathize with 
those receiving help (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 148).  
This paper conceives of deservingness as a general orientation towards the needy, rather 
than a relative ranking of different recipient groups. An exhaustive literature finds that 
individuals across welfare states perceive a similar hierarchy of deservingness between different 
groups of beneficiaries, with the elderly being the most deserving, followed by the sick/disabled, 
with the unemployed, and immigrants in particular seen as the least deserving (e.g. Van Oorschot 
2006; Petersen et al. 2011; Petersen 2012; Petersen 2015; Jensen & Petersen 2017).7 However, if 
respondents perceive a similar rank order of different groups receiving benefits in terms of 
 
6 Cavaillé (2014) and Cavaillé & Trump (2015) refer to these two dimensions of redistribution attitudes as 
“Redistribution To (the poor)” and “Redistribution From (the rich),” respectively.    
 
7 More specifically, scholars have found that perceptions of the work ethic of recipients and the degree of control they 
have over their economic circumstances have an important effect on people’s evaluations of their deservingness 
(Feather, 1999;  Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Magni, 2018b). Research by political psychologists argues that 
deservingness perceptions result from a pre-political, automatic heuristic which motivates individuals to help the 
genuinely needy within their in-group while harshly punishing free riders, a tendency with roots in evolutionary 




deservingness, differences in the level of deservingness they ascribe to welfare state beneficiaries 
in general may be more relevant for voters’ choices between different party families.8  
In contrast with deservingness attitudes, the materialist literature suggests that attitudes 
towards the scope of the welfare state tend to evoke calculations of self-interest, as citizens 
consider whether they would be likely to benefit or lose out from welfare state programs and 
attempts to redistribute income (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Meltzer and Richards 1981; Romer 
1975). Specifically, those with higher income and greater labor market security tend to resist the 
expansion of the welfare state and redistributive taxation, while those with lower incomes and 
greater economic risk tend to support it (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009; Rehm 2011; 
Cavaillé and Trump 2015: 148).  
If deservingness perceptions and welfare state support are separate and distinct 
subdimensions of economic attitudes, it follows that they may shape voting behavior in different 
ways across the party political landscape.  Some parties may attract voters that are highly 
negative on one subdimension, but more positive on another, and vice versa, while other parties’ 
electorates may have congruent views on both subdimensions. This raises the question: what is 
the relationship between voters’ deservingness perceptions and welfare state support and their 
vote choice for different party families? 
  
Deservingness perceptions and welfare state support for radical right and green voters 
Perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries hinge on mechanisms of 
social affinity and empathy that we might expect to speak particularly strongly to radical right 
and green voters, for several reasons. First, voters for both party families tend to stand at 
 
8 For a similar approach geared towards explaining perceptions of welfare beneficiaries generally rather than the 
relative merit of different groups, see Roosma et al. (2015).    
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opposing poles of a libertarian-authoritarian value divide as a function of their support or 
opposition to strong social hierarchies and their divergent levels of tolerance for deviance from 
social norms (Flanagan & Lee 2003; Kitschelt 1994: 10; Stubager 2010: 58). The authoritarian-
libertarian dimension is usually associated in the literature with the socio-cultural, rather than the 
economic divide.9  
However, views of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries reflect attitudes 
towards both social hierarchy and social deviance. On the one hand, the act of demarcating 
deserving from undeserving poor inherently constructs a hierarchy of social legitimacy between 
groups (Van Oorschot 2006); making or rejecting such a categorization thus in part reflects a 
person’s comfort with social hierarchy. On the other hand, those labeled as the undeserving poor 
are by definition perceived as socially deviant since they have failed to uphold norms of personal 
responsibility (Achterberg et al. 2013: 217). Radical right parties in particular have bombarded 
their voters with images of ‘welfare scroungers,’ which likely sharpen perceptions of the needy 
as both undeserving and deviant (Andersen 1992).     . 
A second dynamic which could divide green and radical right voters particularly sharply 
in terms of their deservingness perceptions is their membership in distinct socio-structural and 
status groups. Researchers have found that green voters are disproportionately highly educated, 
urban, and middle class socio-cultural professionals (Dolezal 2010). Radical right voters, on the 
other hand, are disproportionately lower-educated, suburban or rural residents (Oesch & 
Rennwald 2018; Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rydgren 2013). Iversen & Soskice (2019) emphasize the 
spatial dimension of this divide. They argue that, in order to function as engines of postindustrial 
economic growth, cities require concentrations of highly educated professionals, and the public 
 
9 Houtman et al. (2008) is an important exception in its linking of working class authoritarianism to both strong 
preferences for conditionality and populist right voting.  
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investment and cultural diversity required to attract them. Disproportionately working class, low 
education residents of rural or suburban areas, meanwhile, oppose urban-concentrated public 
spending and see diversity as a source of competition for welfare state resources (Iversen and 
Soskice 2019: 52). 
These groups differ markedly not only in their objective social characteristics but also in 
their levels of subjective social status. Social status is a positional good; in other words, status-
conscious individuals care about whether they have more or less status than others. Crucially, 
people tend to be last-place averse (Cavaillé 2014; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Kuziemko et al. 2014). 
The status insecure are thus particularly concerned with policing social boundaries to distance 
and distinguish themselves from those at the very bottom of status hierarchies, a finding reflected 
in quantitative and ethnographic research in both the United States and Europe (Cramer 2016; 
Fiske 2011; Hochschild 2016; Jost & Banaji 1994; Lamont 2000; Tajfel & Turner 1986). In this 
vein, Gidron & Hall (2017) find that low subjective social status is associated with voting for 
radical right parties. By contrast, the relatively high social status of green voters may protect 
them from the need to demarcate themselves from the poor and thus make them more likely to 
attribute neediness to structural factors rather than individual failings.    
In summary, I hypothesize that more positive perceptions of the deservingness of welfare 
state beneficiaries are on average associated with support for green parties and negatively 
associated with support for radical right parties (H1).   
 
H1: perceptions of deservingness are positively associated with support for green parties and 




For parties arrayed on the transnational cleavage, traditional issues of contestation over 
the welfare state are generally secondary in terms of salience. Since green and radical right 
parties seek to attract voters from both left and right party constituencies, they present 
ambiguous or centrist positions on issues of redistribution (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Koedam 
2018; Rovny 2013; Rovny & Polk 2020). Voters’ positions on the economic left/right, 
operationalized in past research by questions about inequality and the scope of the welfare state, 
have thus not been found predictive of voting for green or radical right parties (Dolezal 2010; 
Rovny & Polk 2020: 14). I thus predict that support for the welfare state will not have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of voting for green or radial right (H2) parties.   
 
H2: support for the welfare state is not related to the probability of voting for green or radical 
right parties. 
 
Deservingness perceptions and welfare state support for classic party family voters 
 
Deservingness perceptions may be particularly powerful for green and radical right 
voters, but they should also be relevant for voters for parties along the classic economic left/right 
cleavage.  Discourses about deserving and undeserving recipients have always been a central 
aspect of welfare state politics (Van Oorschot 2006: 23). Historically, parties of the left on the 
traditional class cleavage have tended to attribute poverty and recourse to social benefits to 
structural inequity, while parties on the right of that divide have tended to associate them with 
individual failings. I thus expect positive perceptions of benefit recipients’ deservingness to be 
associated with a higher probability of voting for social democratic and radical left parties and a 




H3: perceptions of deservingness are positively associated with support for social democratic and 
radical left parties and negatively associated with support for conservative and liberal parties. 
 
Parties of the economic left have historically supported an expanded role for the welfare 
state while the converse is true for parties on the right of the classic class and religious cleavages 
(Korpi 1983; Allan & Scruggs 2004). I thus expect that support for the welfare state is on 
average positively associated with the probability of voting for center left and radical left parties, 
and negatively associated with the probability of voting for conservative and liberal parties (H4).  
 
H4: support for the welfare state is positively associated with support for social democratic and 




The 2016 European Social Survey is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses, as it 
includes a battery of questions specifically looking at redistributive preferences and vote choice 
across a range of countries. In particular, I analyze 15 Western European countries10 from the 
dataset in order to examine the relationship between deservingness perceptions, welfare state 
support, and vote choice. 
 
 
10The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries have different party systems, which means the 
choice set for voters varies across them. Since I am interested in capturing the relationship between redistribution 
attitudes and vote choice across a range of party systems, I retain a pooled sample. However, to demonstrate the 
robustness of my results, Appendix 1.3 contains an analysis of a restricted sample of ten countries with the exact same 
constellation of party families. The results are substantively unchanged.      
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Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable is vote choice by party family. The party families are radical left, social 
democratic, green, liberal, conservative,11 and radical right. Parties are coded using a 
combination of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), ParlGov Database (Döring and Manow 
2019), and the author’s own judgment. A full list of party family codings can be found in 
Appendix 1.1. 
 
Key independent variables: attitudes towards deservingness and the welfare state   
 
My key independent variables measure attitudes towards redistribution. I use principle 
component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to analyze the structure of redistribution 
attitudes. I retain the two most coherent components I call Deservingness12 and Welfare State,  
corresponding to Cavaillé and Trump’s (2015) ‘Redistribution To’ and ‘Redistribution From’, 
respectively. Deservingness (eigenvalue=2.88) explains approximately 29% of the variance in 
attitudes towards redistribution, while  welfare state (eigenvalue=1.82) explains about 18% of 
the variance. Full factor loadings can be found in Table 1, below. For ease of comparison, both 
variables are standardized. 
 
11 Since the paper must present a series of statistical analyses of the effects of two different attitudinal subdimensions 
across many different party families, I combine Christian Democratic and Conservative parties into one category for 
parsimony’s sake. This also allows for greater comparability across countries, since some countries may have only a 
conservative party or a Christian democratic party, but not both.    
 
12 Other survey research operationalizes the concept of deservingness with reference to perceptions of specific groups, 
rather than as a general orientation. Such research employs questions asking if specific groups deserve more or less 
money from the welfare state than they currently receive (Jeene et al., 2014), if respondents are concerned about the 
living standards of a group (Van Oorschot, 2006), about their relative concern for each group in relation to others 
(Ibid), or directly if groups are deserving of state financial assistance or not (Van Oorschot, 2000; Jensen and Petersen, 
2017). The factor analysis approach used here has several benefits. Methodologically, combining multiple measures 
reduces the measurement error associated with using single survey items to capture attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. 
2008). This approach also accounts for the fact that deservingness is a multi-faceted concept which may be hard to 
fully capture with a single measure. Substantively, the choice to measure deservingness as a general orientation 
towards the needy rather than a relative evaluation of individual groups is more appropriate for highlighting variation 




Table 1: Rotated Factor Loadings 
                     Variable                                 Deservingness    Welfare State  
Many manage to obtain benefit they are not entitled to .419 -.126 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people lazy 
.526 .054 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people less willing to care for each other 
.504 .002 
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job .494 -.014 
Government should reduce differences in income levels -.017 .413 
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward 
talents and efforts  
.113 .312 
For a society to be fair, differences in people’s 
standard of living should be small 
.036 .376 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the elderly  
-.087 .479 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the unemployed 
.151 .409 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure 
sufficient child care services for working parents  
-.075 .419 
(Strongest loadings in bold) 
 
Questions that load most strongly onto the deservingness component ask respondents to 
make judgments about those who receive social benefits and services and the effects of 
government assistance on recipients’ sense of personal and social responsibility. Answers to 
these questions should reflect respondents’ social affinity with and empathy for benefit 
recipients. Higher values of deservingness indicate more positive views towards benefit 
recipients.  
Questions that load most strongly onto the welfare state component concern attitudes 
towards inequality and the scope of government responsibility in social policy. Instead of 
eliciting a character judgment of or an evaluation of social affinity with some other recipient, 
questions of government responsibility should provoke a calculation of self-interest, in which 
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respondents ask themselves whether they themselves would benefit or not from redistribution. 
Higher values of welfare state indicate support for government responsibility for providing social 
services and reducing inequality. 
It is important to test whether the relationship between deservingness perceptions and 
vote choice is a spurious one driven by support or opposition to immigration. Therefore, another 
substantively vital independent variable in my analyses is immigration attitudes, measured by a 
question asking respondents on a 0-10 scale whether they think immigrants make their country a 




My models include a series of controls. The first is income, measured by respondents’ 
self-reported household income decile. The second is education, an ordinal variable measuring 
highest degree attainment. Subjective economic insecurity is a binary variable in which 
respondents who feel either A: very or somewhat worried about losing their job or B: that it is 
very or somewhat difficult living on their current income  receive a score of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Occupational class is a measure using Oesch’s 8-class typology (see: Oesch 2006). Age is the 
respondent’s age in years. Urban is an ordinal variable measuring whether respondents are from 
a rural area, a small town, a suburb, or a big city). Union is a binary variable with current or past 
union members coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Female is a dummy variable. Finally, Attend 
Services is an ordinal measure of religiosity asking respondents whether they attend religious 
services never or almost never, rarely, or at least once a week. Space limitations preclude a 
discussion of the effects of these controls on vote choice, but full results can be found in 




Distinguishing party family electorates by deservingness perceptions and welfare state support 
Figure 1 displays the mean deservingness (Y axis) and welfare state attitudes (X axis) for 
the voters of each party family. On average, green and radical left voters have the most positive 
deservingness perceptions, followed by social democratic and liberal voters, while conservative 
and (to an even greater extent) radical right voters have the most negative deservingness 
perceptions. On the welfare state subdimension, radical left voters are on average the most 
supportive, while conservative and liberal voters are the most opposed. Green and social 
democratic voters are on average moderately positive on welfare state, while radical right voters 
are moderately negative.  
 
Figure 1: Mean Deservingness and Welfare state By Party Family 
 
 
Moving beyond descriptive analysis, multinomial logistic regression allows us to measure 
whether and how deservingness perceptions and welfare state support affect voting for different 
party families under statistical controls. These models are long and unwieldy, so I limit my 
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discussion to the effects of deservingness and welfare state support on vote choice and report the 
full results with controls in Appendix 1.2. Multinomial logistic regression requires that a base 
outcome be omitted for comparison; I choose conservative parties for this purpose. Coefficients 
can thus be interpreted as the effect of deservingness perceptions and welfare state support on 
voting for a given party family, relative to voting for a conservative party (and under all the 




Table 2 below displays multinomial logistic regression coefficients for the effects of  
deservingness perceptions and welfare state support on vote choice. As we can see, both have 
effects on vote choice, however, the pattern of their associations varies across party families. In 
keeping with expectations in H3 and H4 respectively, positive perceptions of benefit recipients’ 
deservingness and welfare state support distinguish radical left and social democratic voters from 
conservative voters, on average. In keeping with H1, positive perceptions of deservingness have 
the strongest association with voting green, relative to voting conservative. Contrary to H2, 
support for the welfare state is also strongly associated with green support on average, although 
the relationship is weaker than that for deservingness. Liberal voters are not significantly 
different from conservative voters on either subdimension. However, given the similar positions 
of liberal and conservative parties on the welfare state subdimension, this model is unable to test 
H3 or H4, a problem imposed by the necessity of omitting a base category for comparison.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the contrast between radical right and conservative 
voters. Negative perceptions of deservingness are on average statistically significantly associated 
with support for radical right parties, even relative to conservative parties. However radical right 
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voters are also statistically significantly more positive towards the welfare state than 
conservative voters.  
 
 
Table 2: Effect of Deservingness Perceptions & Welfare State Support on Party Family 
Vote 






.37*** (.03) .47***(.09) 
Radical Left .67***(.04) .72***(.07) 
Liberal .17(.12) .08(.11) 
Green .75*** (.08) .38*** (.08) 
Radical Right -.26*** (.07) .33*** (.08) 
         N= 12,105. R2 =.19. For complete results with controls, see Appendix 2a.  
 
To interpret the relative magnitude of effects of deservingness and welfare state on vote 
choice, predicted probabilities derived from the multinomial logistic regression model are more 
useful than regression coefficients. All figures below report the probability of voting for a given 
party family across the range of both deservingness and welfare state values, holding all controls 
at their means. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 2 reports the predicted probability of voting for parties on the transnational 
cleavage across the range of deservingness and welfare state values, under controls. 
Deservingness perceptions stand out for their powerful effects on the probability of voting for 
green and radical right parties. Respondents with the most negative deservingness perceptions 
have slightly less than a 2% chance of voting green, while those with the most positive 
perceptions of deservingness are over seven times as likely to vote green at around 15%. 
Conversely, respondents with the most negative deservingness perceptions are the most likely to 
vote for radical right parties at approximately 14%, while those with the highest deservingness 
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perceptions have only an approximately 3% chance of voting for a radical right party. This 
constitutes strong evidence in favor of H1. This mirror image of the impacts of deservingness 
perceptions for each party suggests a potentially novel attitudinal basis underlying green and 
radical right voters’ opposing positions on either side of the transnational cleavage.   
By contrast, variation in welfare state support has no statistically significant effect on the 
probability of voting for either green or radical right parties. The lack of statistically significant 
effects of welfare state support on voting green or radical right also suggests that this 
subdimension is secondary for both party families. This finding constitutes evidence in support 
of H2. 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Voting Green or Radical Right By Deservingness and 
Welfare state 
  
  Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
Figure 3 reports the predicted probabilities of voting for social democratic or 
conservative parties, under controls. In contrast to voters for parties along the transnational 
cleavage, positions on deservingness and welfare state subdimensions have very similar effects 
on the probability of voting for these older parties of the left/right cleavage. Respondents with 
the most negative views of deservingness have approximately a 22% chance of voting for social 
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democrats, while those with the most positive views almost twice as likely to vote social 
democratic at about 38%. The estimates for the effects of welfare state support are strongly 
similar.  
Conversely, respondents with the most negative deservingness perceptions have about a 
42% chance of voting conservative, which falls to approximately 20% for those with the most 
positive deservingness perceptions. The relationship is similar for welfare state support, with 
respondents with the most negative welfare state attitudes most likely to vote conservative at 




Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Voting Social Democratic or Conservative By 
Deservingness and Welfare State 
 
Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
Turning to our final two party families, Figure 4 reports the effect of deservingness 
perceptions and welfare state support on voting for liberal and radical left parties. For liberal 
parties, the confidence intervals are very large, indicating a high degree of uncertainty about the 
point estimates of the effects of both subdimensions. There is no statistically significant effect of 
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deservingness on liberal voting, evidence against H3. There is, however, a statistically significant 
negative effect of welfare state support on voting for liberal parties, evidence in support of H4. 
The effects of deservingness perceptions and welfare state support on the probability of voting 
for the radical left are clearer and highly congruent; at the most negative values of each, the 
probability of radical left voting is about 3%, but at the highest values rise to around 12%. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Liberal and Radical Left Voting 
  




Robustness check: is deservingness just a proxy for immigration or EU integration attitudes? 
 
One might argue that the deservingness subdimension itself is simply a reflection of 
immigration attitudes which are central to the socio-cultural dimension. Citizens generally see 
immigrants as less deserving of public benefits and services than natives (Magni 2020; Van der 
Waal et al. 2013; Van Oorschot 2006; Van Oorschot & Uunk 2007). In the U.S., with the rising 
salience of immigration, perceptions of immigrants are now strong predictors of attitudes 
towards welfare recipients generally (Garand et al. 2017). Perhaps this is why deservingness 
perceptions so powerfully predict support or opposition to parties for whom immigration is a 
defining issue. However, even if this were to be true, it should be noted that none of the 
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questions which make up the deservingness variable mention immigration or immigrants at all. 
To the extent that questions about the deservingness of benefit recipients map closely onto 
support or opposition to immigration, this sheds light on how migrants have become the new 
face of the “undeserving poor.”  
Yet we can also go a step further and directly test whether the propensity of those with 
low and high deservingness perceptions to vote for radical right and green parties respectively 
can be explained by their immigration attitudes. Figure 5 below shows the predicted probability 
of voting for green or radical right parties according to deservingness perceptions, holding all 
controls at their mean except for immigration attitudes. Radical right and green voters stand out 
for their particularly negative and positive attitudes towards immigration, respectively. To 
account for this, I set immigration attitudes to their 10th percentile for the model of radical right 
voting, and to their 90th percentile for green voting.13 
Controlling for immigration attitudes has little effect on the relationship between 
deservingness and support for green parties. Controlling for immigration attitudes does weaken 
the effect of deservingness perceptions on the probability of voting radical right. Nonetheless, 
deservingness perceptions continue to have a strong and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of voting for a radical right party, even after controlling for immigration attitudes. 
Deservingness perceptions, it appears, are related to immigration attitudes but have a strong 






13 For the sake of space, I only display predicted probabilities for radical right and green voters, whose support I 
expect to be most strongly related to deservingness perceptions. 
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Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Green and Radical Right Voting, Controlling For 
Immigration Attitudes 
   
     Note: predicted probabilities derived from multinomial logistic regression, bars represent 95% confidence                                                                           
     intervals.        
 
 
Kleider & Stoeckel’s (2018) analysis of supranational redistribution attitudes suggests 
that in the wake of the eurozone crisis and bailouts, distributional conflict has a European as well 
as a national dimension. Traditionally a defining issue for parties on the transnational cleavage, 
support for European integration could also potentially confound the relationship between 
deservingness perceptions and the probability of voting green or radical right. As a robustness 
check, I re-run the multinomial logistic regression predicting vote choice, controlling for 
respondents’ opposition to or support for European integration on a 0-10 scale in addition to 
previous controls. I again derive predicted probabilities for voting radical right and green across 
the range of deservingness and welfare state. I find deservingness perceptions are strongly 
associated with radical right and green voting, even after controlling for both immigration and 




There are four main takeaways from these analyses. First, the results suggest that 
deservingness perceptions are worthy of study as a substantively important predictor of vote 
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choice, alongside more commonly researched attitudes about the scope of the welfare state. In 
political conflicts over redistribution, moral judgments of the beneficiaries of the welfare state 
are as important as disputes over its size and scope. Vote choice on the economic dimension is 
thus shaped to an important degree by individuals’ orientations towards hierarchy and social 
deviance, previously associated primarily with the socio-cultural dimension.   
Second, this paper’s findings underline the value of analyzing redistribution attitudes in a 
multi-dimensional framework. Attitudes on the economic dimension are an important predictor 
of green and radical right voting. This suggests that these voters are motivated by more than just 
positions on socio-cultural issues like immigration and European integration. However, this 
becomes apparent only once the economic dimension has been disaggregated into components of 
deservingness and welfare state support. Through this lens, we see that voters for different party 
families combine attitudes along these two subdimensions in distinct ways. The effects of the 
two sets of attitudes on vote choice are congruent for mainstream party voters, but not for voters 
for newer parties competing on the transnational cleavage, who stand out for their polar positions 
on deservingness.  
Thirdly, the effects of deservingness perceptions on vote choice may help explain 
changes in the links between socio-structural groups and political parties. This includes the 
much-studied flight of less-educated working class voters from parties of the left to parties of the 
radical right (e.g. Harteveld 2016; Houtman et al. 2008; Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Rydgren 
2013), as well as the shift of highly educated professionals from liberal and conservative parties 
to green, left, and center-left parties (Arndt 2014; Beramendi et al 2015; Hausermann et al. 2015; 
Kitschelt 1994; Oesch & Rennwald 2018; Piketty 2018; Abou-Chadi & Immergut 2019). Most 
recently, this “New Partisanship” literature has fruitfully used multi-dimensional analyses of 
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redistribution attitudes in explaining vote choice, focusing in particular on the trade-off between 
preferences for maintaining social consumption policies demanded by working class voters and 
social investment policies preferred by the so-called “New Middle Class”.  
A deservingness/welfare state framework may challenge the strict tradeoff between social 
consumption and social investment preferences posited by the New Partisanship literature in 
favor of a voter calculus that mixes economic self-interest and deservingness perceptions. The 
moral judgments formed by different social classes may sometimes predispose them to support 
or oppose certain types of social spending in line with their preferences on social consumption 
vs. social investment, and sometimes may contradict these preferences. For example, in deciding 
who to vote for, working class voters’ disproportionate reliance on unemployment benefits may 
conflict with their perceptions of welfare abuse by undeserving freeloaders.  
Finally, these findings speak to the bounded relevance of immigration for the politics of 
redistribution. Controlling for immigration attitudes weakens the relationship between 
deservingness perceptions and voting for radical right parties. This suggests that radical right 
voters’ general perceptions of deservingness are mediated by their negative attitudes towards 
immigrants, implying a view of immigrants as undeserving welfare recipients. However, 
controlling for immigration attitudes has virtually no impact on the relationship between 
deservingness and the predicted probability of voting green. Moreover, the negative association 
between deservingness and radical right voting holds even after controlling for immigration 
attitudes and support or opposition to EU integration. The opposition of green and radical right 
voters on deservingness is thus strengthened by the rise of welfare chauvinism, but also appears 
to be related to a deeper divide potentially rooted in status differences and 
authoritarian/libertarian values.   
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This paper argues that deservingness perceptions and welfare state attitudes are 
substantively important for vote choice in different combinations for voters of different party 
families. However, the cross-sectional data on which the analysis relies gives a static perspective. 
Further research should investigate how individuals’ positions on these two subdimensions 
connect to changes in partisanship over time. Furthermore, the scope of this paper was limited to 
the demand side, but future research should further explore connections between deservingness 
perceptions, welfare state attitudes, and vote choice on the supply side. In particular, what is the 
role of exogenous shocks, media coverage and framing, and party strategies in shaping the 
relationship between voters’ attitudes on the two subdimensions and their vote choice? The 
results of this paper should be interpreted with caution, as the cross-sectional nature of the data 
does not allow us to tell whether deservingness perceptions and welfare state support are 
influencing vote choice, or whether support for a certain type of party leads voters to adopt that 
party’s positioning on the two subdimensions. In addressing these questions, longitudinal data 
combining measures of deservingness perceptions, welfare state support, and vote choice will be 



















CHAPTER 2: REDISTRIBUTION ATTITUDES AND VOTE CHOICE ACROSS THE 
EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE 
 
The Argument in Brief 
Education has emerged as an increasingly central social divide in contemporary electoral 
politics, but its attitudinal underpinnings are disputed. Most researchers have argued that 
divisions over socio-cultural conflicts around immigration and supranational authority are 
responsible for the rise of an education cleavage anchored by radical right, green, and liberal 
parties (Stubager 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Ford and Jennings 2020: 300-302). However, 
economic inequality along educational lines is as sharp as ever, stoking renewed scholarly 
interest in the effects of education on attitudes towards redistribution (Mendelberg et al. 2017; 
Marshall 2019; Bullock 2020; Gelepithis and Giani 2020).   
I argue we can more fully understand the education cleavage by integrating recent 
insights on the measurement of redistribution attitudes, which distinguish between attitudes 
about the proper scope of the welfare state and perceptions about the deservingness of welfare 
state beneficiaries (Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and Trump 2015; Laenen 2020). Traditional 
models of political economy view education as a labor market asset and therefore predict that the 
relatively secure educated oppose redistribution out of self-interest, while the precarious less-
educated support it. In contrast, a conception of education as a marker of social status suggests 
that status-secure university graduates may be less likely than the less-educated to draw harsh 
boundaries against welfare state beneficiaries as a means to maintain social esteem. These 
theoretical approaches imply divergent effects of education on two separate subdimensions of 
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redistribution attitudes: preferences towards the responsibilities of the welfare state and attitudes 
towards the deservingness of the needy. 
Analyses of 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) data from 15 Western European 
countries demonstrate these contrasting effects. First, the validity of the welfare state and 
deservingness subdimensions finds support in principal component analyses. Subsequent OLS 
regression analyses reveal that, on average, higher levels of education are associated with 
opposition to state responsibility for maintaining decent living standards, but also with 
perceptions that those receiving help from the welfare state are more deserving. By contrast, low 
levels of education are associated with the opposite pattern; on average being more favorable 
towards social provision by government, but also more likely to consider welfare state 
beneficiaries as shirkers gaming the system.  
What implications does this have for the education cleavage in electoral politics?  Kappa 
mediation analyses allow for the decomposition of education effects and estimation of the extent 
to which these two types of redistribution attitudes explain educational divides in voting. 
Decomposing the effects of education on vote choice reveals that deservingness perceptions are a 
particularly important mediator, explaining between a fifth and a quarter of education effects on 
vote choice for radical right and green parties, whose voters are the most educationally 
distinctive. The evidence that attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state mediate the effects 
of education on vote choice is more mixed. However, welfare state support does play a role in 
explaining education effects on vote choice between proximate party families competing in 
political space, such as the radical right and conservatives. 
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it applies advances in the literature on 
the multi-dimensionality of redistribution attitudes to analyses of cross-national data in order to 
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shed light on conflicting evidence about whether education is associated with support or 
opposition to redistribution. Second, it connects these educational divides in redistribution 
attitudes to the emergent education cleavage in electoral politics. Less educated voters, who on 
average see welfare state beneficiaries as undeserving, are disproportionately attracted to the 
radical right; highly educated voters who on average have the most positive perceptions of 
welfare state beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to support green parties. This helps to 
explain why green and radical right voters represent the poles of the educational divide, the 
attitudinal basis of which is usually understood to be socio-cultural rather than redistributive 
(Stubager 2010; Dolezal 2010; Hooghe & Marks 2018). In postindustrial economies, divisions 
between those with high and low education over the welfare state and its beneficiaries are a 
significant, complementary explanation for the rise of an educational cleavage, alongside 
conflicts over immigration and transnationalism.  
 
Why It Matters: The Educational Divide in Postindustrial Politics  
 
A prominent vein of scholarship asserts that advanced democracies are undergoing the 
rise of a new structural cleavage between winners and losers of postindustrial change (Kriesi 
1998; Bornschier 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Differences in educational endowments lie at 
the core of this divide (Stubager 2009; Stubager 2010; Margalit 2012; Häusermann & Kriesi 
2015). The well-educated are relatively well-equipped to succeed in competitive 
internationalized and increasingly skill-intensive labor markets. Those with less education suffer 
greater insecurity and worry more about the prospect of competition from immigrants, both in 
the labor market and over welfare state resources. What this educational divide means for the 
politics of redistribution, however, is unclear.  
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Despite the link between education and economic security, less-educated working class 
voters have increasingly moved away from social democratic parties and into “proletarianized” 
parties of the radical right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1994; Houtman et al. 2008; Rydgren 2013; 
Harteveld 2016; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). Highly educated professionals, on the other hand, 
have become a key constituency of left-wing parties in many countries (Häusermann et al. 2012: 
228; Piketty 2018).  Political realignments along educational lines are often attributed to the 
increasing salience of issues of immigration and supranational integration, which divide those 
with high and low levels of education (Kriesi et al. 2008; Teney et al. 2014; Hooghe & Marks 
2018: 7-8). However, in an era of rising inequality and precarity, distributional conflict is far 
from over. Contestation over the welfare state has morphed rather than disappeared, reshaping 
coalitions in distributive politics (Bonoli & Natali 2012; Häusermann & Geering 2012; Kitschelt 
& Rehm 2014; Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Beramendi et al. 2015).  
 
Unpacking Redistribution: Education Effects in a Multi-Dimensional Context 
 
One of the central themes of recent literature on social policy is that welfare states not 
only redistribute resources but also insure individuals against risk (Gingrich & Ansell, 2012: 
1627). We would thus expect that the risks individuals face in the labor market affect their level 
of support for redistribution. Particularly in the context of the knowledge economy, researchers 
have found that education and skills are not only associated with higher income but also with 
lower risk of unemployment (e.g. Kapstein 2002; Powell & Snellman 2004). As a result of this 
insurance function of education, research in political economy has found that education reduces 
individuals’ support for redistribution (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & Wallerstein 2001; 
Alesina & Giuliano 2011; Rehm 2009; Rehm 2011; Busemeyer 2014; Bullock 2020).  
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This literature thus makes claims about a negative relationship between education and 
support for redistribution generally, often tested using a survey item about whether government 
should reduce differences in income levels. However, recent literature on welfare state 
preferences in postindustrial societies highlights the drawbacks of a unidimensional 
understanding and measurement of redistribution, and demonstrates the value of analyzing 
different dimensions of redistribution attitudes to explain the changing social structure of 
distributional conflict (e.g. Gingrich & Häusermann 2015; Beramendi et al. 2015; Garritzmann 
et al. 2018). So far, this work has focused on the relationship of income and occupational class to 
different aspects of redistribution preferences.14 I build on this literature by analyzing how the 
educational divide that is increasingly reshaping the political landscape relates to two particular 
subdimensions of redistribution attitudes. 
Cavaillé and Trump (2015) demonstrate that there are two distinct subdimensions of 
redistribution attitudes that prime different psychological mechanisms. Issues of “redistribution 
from” the rich involve questions about the state’s responsibility to meet generalized social needs 
and reduce inequality (Ibid), evoking questions evoke “self-oriented” considerations of 
individuals’ relative economic position and whether they would personally benefit from social 
programs and efforts to reduce inequality. Since the psychological mechanism triggered is one of 
self-interest, these issues divide high earners who will bear the brunt of taxes used to finance 
redistribution from low earners who would be the primary beneficiaries of it (Ibid: 148).  
 
14 Häusermann & Kriesi’s (2015) analyses link attitudes and socio-structural variables including education to vote 
choice. My contribution focuses on the relationship between education and redistribution attitudes, and the extent to 
which the relationship between education and vote choice is mediated by these attitudes. Häusermann & Kriesi (2015) 
also include measures of what they call “welfare misuse”, which overlap with the deservingness dimension employed 
in this paper. However, they subsume these items under a much broader dimension of universalism-particularism, a 
factor which also includes attitudes about the EU, cultural liberalism, and immigration.      
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Hypothesis 1 is consistent with the same self-interest based logic as the classic political 
economy model: because education is an important labor market asset, on average, those with 
higher levels of educational attainment should oppose a more expansive role for government in 
providing economic security and reducing inequality (H1).    
 
Hypothesis 1: education is negatively associated with support for the welfare state.    
 
By contrast, issues of “redistribution to” the poor or disadvantaged prime mechanisms of 
social affinity and empathy (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 148). Instead of inward-facing calculations 
of personal benefit or cost, individuals’ views on deservingness reflect a) whether or not they 
view the needy as worthy of help, and b) whether they view the act of helping recipients as just 
and unproblematic, or instead view social assistance through the lens of moral hazard.15  
One might expect the economically secure to blame benefit recipients’ situation on 
individual failings, rather than the unfairness or dysfunction of a social structure within which 
they live. However, empirical research consistently finds that more affluent people are less likely 
than their poorer counterparts to blame poverty on personal failings. Bullock’s (1999: 2076) 
study of Americans’ attitudes towards welfare finds that the poor were more likely to attribute 
welfare recipients’ situation to laziness, relative to middle class respondents. Van Oorschot 
(2006: 34) similarly notes that “it is often found that those in lower socio-economic positions 
 
15 This conceptualization is distinct from previous research focused on perceptions of the relative deservingness of 
particular groups. Scholars have found that recipients’ perceived effort and degree of control over their economic 
fortunes have a significant impact on people’s evaluations of their deservingness (Fincham and Jaspers 1980; Feather 
1999; Magni 2018b). Van Oorschot (2006) finds that individuals living in different welfare state regimes perceive a 
similar spectrum of deservingness from the elderly (most deserving), to the sick and disabled, to the unemployed, and 
finally to immigrants (least deserving). Some researchers argue that deservingness perceptions stem from a pre-
political, reflexive heuristic rooted in evolutionary psychology (Petersen et al. 2011; Petersen 2012; Petersen 2015; 
Jensen & Petersen 2017).   
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have more negative views of, e.g. unemployed people and people on benefit.” At the other end of 
the economic spectrum, Rueda (2017) argues that the wealthy are more sensitive to altruistic 
concerns than the poor, since their relative security gives them greater latitude to take non-
material considerations into account in forming attitudes towards redistribution.  
One potential explanation for this counter-intuitive relationship between economic 
standing and perceptions of the vulnerable lies in how the psychological pressures of status 
insecurity can sharpen negative evaluations of stigmatized groups (Fiske 2011; Elchardus and 
Spruyt 2012; Ridgeway 2019). Crucially, when it comes to social status, people tend to be last-
place averse (Kuziemko et al. 2014; Cavaillé 2014). Lower status groups are particularly 
strongly motivated to defend the status order to maintain their continued separation from 
stigmatized populations at the very bottom of status hierarchies (Lamont 2000; Gidron & Hall 
2017; Gidron & Hall 2020). Indeed, social psychologists have argued that “if low status groups 
cannot construct a positive social identity, then group members may resort to denigrating 
outgroups of similar status in an attempt to raise the relative status of their in-group by lowering 
the status of a perceived competitor” (Kuppens et al. 2015: 1261).   
There is reason to believe these status dynamics are particularly strongly linked to 
education. The advent of mass higher education has strengthened its social legitimacy as a 
measure of worth. Despite contemporary increases in inequality, meritocratic narratives present 
academic attainment as the path for individuals to achieve social mobility in spite of their social 
backgrounds (Bourdieu 1984). As a result, education is closely associated with an individual’s 
place in contemporary status hierarchies (Fiske 2011; Ridgeway 2019).  
As the ranks of the university-educated have increased, the subjective social status of 
those with lower levels of education has fallen (Spruyt and Kuppens 2015; Gidron and Hall 
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2017: S74; Gidron and Hall 2020). Often, lower status groups can combat social stigma by 
forming their own positive in-group identities. However, the less-educated struggle to pursue this 
strategy. Their low status is socially legitimated, and the absence of educational attainment offers 
little material with which to build positive group identification (Kuppens et al. 2015). Less-
educated people might thus instead adopt negative views of welfare beneficiaries’ deservingness 
in an effort to distance themselves from their membership in a low-status group (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986; Jost & Banaji 1994; Stubager 2009; Fiske 2011: 102-103). The relatively secure 
social status of the highly educated, meanwhile, obviates the need to stigmatize benefit recipients 
in order to maintain social esteem. I thus hypothesize that increases in education are also 
associated with positive perceptions of recipients’ deservingness (H2).   
 
Hypothesis 2: education is positively associated with favorable perceptions of benefit recipients’ 
deservingness.  
 
Implications of Welfare State and Deservingness Attitudes for Education Effects on Vote 
Choice 
 
Education is increasingly powerful, not only in shaping attitudes and values, but also as a 
structural divide in contemporary party politics (Hausermänn & Kriesi 2015; Hooghe & Marks 
2017; Kriesi et al. 2012; Stubager 2010). This perspective suggests that attitudes and values 
partly mediate the effect of education on voting behavior; structurally-rooted groups in conflict 
develop distinct attitudes and preferences which are reflected in their vote choice. Mostly, 
scholars have conceived of the education cleavage as expressing conflicts over socio-cultural 
issues of immigration and national authority. However, if there are indeed significant differences 
in welfare state support and perceptions of deservingness across educational groups, we can 
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expect them to have implications for voting patterns by education, since there is evidence that 
these attitudes are themselves a significant predictor of vote choice (Attewell 2021). 
In terms of theoretical expectations, then, a political economy perspective on the 
education cleavage suggests that the relative economic security of the higher-educated should 
predispose them to vote for liberal and conservative parties which oppose an expansive and 
egalitarian welfare state (H3a).  
 
Hypothesis 3a: higher educated voters’ lower levels of welfare state support mediate the effect of 
education on voting for liberal and conservative parties. 
 
Conversely, the relatively economically precarious lower-educated should be more likely 
to vote for radical left and social democratic parties which are supportive of state responsibility 
for maintaining decent living standards (H3b).  
 
Hypothesis 3b: lower educated voters’ higher values of welfare state support mediate the effect of 
education on voting for radical left and social democratic parties.     
 
A perspective which instead views educational attainment as conferring or diminishing 
status has different implications. Status insecurity and feelings of relative deprivation are 
associated with voting for radical right parties (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012; Gidron and Hall 
2017; Suryanarayan 2019). Such parties offer scapegoating narratives centered not only on 
ethnic minorities, but also the unemployed, who they cast as undeserving benefit scroungers 
(Andersen 1992; de Koster et al. 2012; Afonso and Rennwald 2018). As a result, the status 
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insecurity of the lower educated should motivate them to vote disproportionately for radical right 
parties who offer their voters a positive relative comparison with stigmatized welfare state 
beneficiaries.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: deservingness perceptions mediate the effect of education on voting for radical 
right parties.   
 
Conversely, the highly educated are not status insecure and lack motivation to draw sharp 
downwards boundaries against the needy. High levels of education promote discomfort with 
strict moral hierarchy and denigration of outgroups, and so may be associated with a greater 
tendency to perceive poverty as due to structural rather than individual failings. 
Disproportionately high-education green voters have been shown to be ideologically supportive 
of redistribution, even if their relative affluence renders their material incentives towards 
redistribution more mixed (Bremer and Schwander 2019; Röth and Schwander 2021)—yet our 
two-dimensional framework suggests this support will be more strongly applicable to 
deservingness perceptions than to attitudes about the scope of the welfare state. Their relative 
status security and more positive perceptions of the needy may thus partly explain the tendency 
of the highly educated to vote for green parties (Dolezal 2010).  
 






Data and Methods 
 
The 2016 ESS is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses because it includes an 
extensive battery of questions on redistributive preferences and attitudes across a range of 
countries. In particular, I analyze 15 Western European countries16 from the dataset in order to 
examine the relationship between education and attitudes towards redistribution. Below I explain 
the operationalization of the different variables; full descriptive statistics can be found in 
Appendix 2.1.  
 
Dependent variables: deservingness perceptions and welfare state support 
   
The first set of dependent variables of interest measure attitudes towards redistribution. 
Previous cross-national research on attitudes towards redistribution often relies on a single 
question which directly asks respondents about their support or opposition to government 
redistribution of incomes. This is understandable because most cross-national survey datasets 
lack multiple questions on attitudes towards redistribution which are consistently repeated over 
time. However, this operationalization is both theoretically and empirically problematic if 
attitudes towards redistribution are multi-dimensional (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 146).  
I thus use principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to analyze the 
structure of redistribution attitudes.17 I again retain the two strongest components I call 
 
16 Countries included in the analyses are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. I exclude countries which were 
part of the former Soviet Bloc, since the transition from communism led to sharp discontinuities in their education 
regimes, which transformed the availability of education and its relationship to labor market outcomes across 
generations (Kwiek 2014).   
 




deservingness and welfare state, corresponding to Cavaillé and Trump (2015)’s “redistribution 
to” and “redistribution from”, respectively.18 Deservingness explains about 24% of the variance 
in redistribution attitudes, while  welfare state explains about 23% of the variance in 
redistribution attitudes. Both variables are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1, so their effects can be more easily compared.  
 
Table 3: Rotated Factor Loadings 
Survey Item Deservingness Welfare State 
Government should reduce differences in income levels -.020 .414 
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward 
talents and efforts  
.112 .315 
For a society to be fair, differences in people’s 
standard of living should be small 
.036 .376 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the elderly  
-.086 .478 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the unemployed 
.150 .407 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure 
sufficient child care services for working parents  
-.073 .418 
Many manage to obtain benefits they are not entitled to .420 -.127 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people lazy 
.525 .057 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people less willing to care for each other 
.503 .004 
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job .495 -.017 




18 This paper uses the conceptual labels of deservingness and welfare state because they capture general orientations 
towards welfare state beneficiaries (the unemployed as well as the poor) and the preferences for the scope of 
government social policy. The survey questions used to construct the dependent variables in this paper overlap with 
those used to construct the dimensions of “Redistribution To” and “Redistribution From” in Cavaillé (2014) and 
Cavaille & Trump (2015) from 2008 European Social Survey data, but not all questions from the 2008 survey wave 
were available in the 2016 ESS.    
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Questions that load most strongly onto the deservingness component ask respondents to 
make judgments about people who receive social benefits and services and the effects of 
government assistance on recipients’ sense of personal and social responsibility.19 This 
theoretical framework suggests these questions should tap respondents’ social affinity with 
benefit recipients. Higher values of deservingness indicate more positive views towards benefit 
recipients.  
Questions that load most strongly onto the welfare state component concern attitudes 
towards inequality and the scope of government responsibility in social and economic policy. 
Questions of government responsibility should provoke a calculation of self-interest, in which 
respondents ask themselves whether or not they would personally benefit from redistribution. 
Higher values on welfare state indicate support for government responsibility for providing 
social services and reducing inequality.  
 
Dependent variable: vote choice  
 
The second dependent variable of interest is vote choice, which is operationalized by 
grouping political parties into party families which share historical and ideological traditions, 
namely conservative, social democratic, radical right, liberal, green, and radical left. Details on 
the coding of party families, including a full list of parties, appear in Appendix 1.1.  
 
   
 
19 Other research on welfare state attitudes operationalizes the concept of deservingness in different ways, asking 
respondents whether specific groups deserve more or less money from the welfare state than they currently receive 
(Jeene et al. 2014), whether respondents are concerned about a certain group’s living standards and their relative 
concern for each group in relation to others (Van Oorschot 2006), or most directly whether the members of a given 




Key independent variable: education 
 
The central independent variable is Education. It is operationalized as an ordinal variable 
which uses the cross-nationally harmonized ISCED measure to capture the respondents’ highest 
level of educational attainment. It ranges from less than a lower secondary education, to lower 
secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower 
tertiary, and finally a higher tertiary degree. This measure allows for a more fine-grained 
understanding of the effects of education on redistribution which can capture non-linearities in 
the relationship.  
 
Controls  
In keeping with other literature on attitudes towards redistribution, I also include a series 
of controls: female gender, religiosity (operationalized as never, rarely, or weekly church 
attendance), union membership (a dichotomous measure of respondents current or previous 
membership vs. never having been in a union), rural/urban location (an ordinal measure ranging 
from the reference category of farm or country village, town or small city, and suburbs, to big 
city), and age. In the main models, I do not control for income and class in order to avoid post-
treatment bias, or ‘overcontrol’ (Elwert 2013); since these follow partly from education, they 
would be mediators, rather than confounders of educational effects on attitudes and vote choice.  
 
Modelling 
There are two types of models in the analyses. Since the attitudinal dependent variables 
are continuous, this paper first employs OLS regressions predicting deservingness perceptions 
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and welfare state attitudes with Education as the main independent variable, in addition to 
controls.  
The second type of models are kappa mediation analyses based on logistic regressions 
predicting vote choice for a given party family. Assessing the extent to which the educational 
divide in electoral politics is mediated by welfare state and deservingness attitudes requires a 
means of decomposing the direct and indirect effects (via attitudes) of education on vote choice 
(Langsæther 2019a; Langsæther 2019b). Traditional mediation analysis is not appropriate for 
measuring the total effect of a categorical independent variable like education, since this would 
instead capture the effect for each education group relative to the reference category (Langsæther 
2019b: 4). I instead employ the kappa index, which has previously been used to measure the 
direct and indirect effects of key structural variables like class and religion on voting (Hout et al. 
1995; Manza & Brooks 1997; Evans & Tilley 2017; Langsæther 2019a; Langsæther 2019b).20  
For a given party family, the kappa index is defined as the standard deviation of logistic 
regression coefficients of a given structural variable (in this case, levels of educational 
attainment) as a predictor of voting for that party family vs. all other party families.21 Higher 
kappas signify greater differences in vote choice across educational groups. In deriving the 
kappas, I include only age and sex as control variables which are causally prior to education. The 
idea is to avoid controlling for other variables which could come after education in the causal 
chain in an attempt not to introduce post-treatment bias into my estimations of the effects of 
 
20 Since the outcome variable of voting is categorical, classic structural equation models are not appropriate, while 
GSEM models face convergence problems.  
 
21 A further set of analyses mentioned in the robustness checks on p. 49 will instead use logistic regressions 
predicting vote choice between two competing parties.  
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education (Langsaether 2019b: 4). In the first step of this analysis, I estimate the following 





) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where P is the probability that respondent i voted for a given party family, 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  
is a vector of dummy variables for each level of educational attainment, 𝛽1 is a vector of the 
coefficients of these education dummies, and 𝑍𝑖is a vector of control variables including age, 
sex, and country dummies. The “gross kappa” is the standard devation of coefficients in vector 
𝛽1, and represents the total effect of education on voting. The gross kappa for each party family 














 is the logistic regression coefficient associated with voting for party family j 
for a given level of education s (with the 𝛽 for the reference category of the lowest level of 
education equal to 0), and 𝛽𝑠
𝑗̅̅ ̅ is the mean of the regression coefficients across all S levels of 
education (Ibid; Lachat 2006). To estimate the “net kappa”, I re-estimate the logistic regression 
models including 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 as controls, which estimate the effects of deservingness and welfare 
state attitudes on vote choice, respectively. This net kappa represents the direct effect of 
education on voting, potentially attributable to socialization or group identity (Langsæther 2018).  
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Finally, the total effect minus the direct effect captures the indirect effect of education on 
voting: the effect of education on voting which is mediated through the channel of deservingness 
and welfare state attitudes. This is not a standard mediation analysis, but instead offers an 
approximate measure of the share of the association between education and vote choice 
explained by deservingness and welfare state (Langsæther 2019b; see also Tilley 2015 and Tilley 
& Evans 2017 for examples of similar approaches to decomposing effects of social structure on 
vote choice).    
All models include country fixed-effects to account for unobserved characteristics of 




For descriptive purposes, Figure 6 displays the uncontrolled means of deservingness and 
welfare state across educational groups. The lowest educational group has both the most negative 
deservingness perceptions and the highest average welfare state support on average, but this 
relationship slowly reverses for increasingly higher levels of education. The tertiary educated 
represent nearly the opposite pattern: this group has by far the most positive perceptions of 
deservingness but also displays moderate opposition to the welfare state. Building upon 
Cavaillé’s (2014: 199) finding for Great Britain, breaking down redistribution attitudes into 











Figure 7 shows an OLS model predicting welfare state attitudes under controls. The 
results demonstrate that the relationship between education and support for the welfare state is 
negative and statistically significant, under controls. All educational groups are less supportive of 
welfare state relative to the reference category of those with less than a lower secondary 
education. Effects range from an average reduction of about .08 standard deviation units in 
support for welfare state for lower secondary educated respondents relative to the reference 
category, to an average reduction of .33 standard deviation units for those with a higher tertiary 
education relative to the reference category. This offers support for Hypothesis 1 in line with the 
expectations of the political economy model.  
Also in keeping with the literature, other statistically significant predictors of support for 
the welfare state among the controls include union membership, female gender, and living in a 
town or big city, while attending church is negatively and statistically significantly associated 
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Figure 7: Determinants of Welfare State Support 
 
 
Figure 8 reports the results of a model estimating the determinants of deservingness. The 
results show higher levels of education are strongly and statistically significantly associated with 
more positive perceptions of deservingness relative to the reference category of less than a 
secondary education, even after controlling for age, church attendance, and rural/urban location. 
Specifically, those with a lower tertiary education are on average .48 standard deviation units 
more positive and those with a higher tertiary education are on average .61 standard deviation 
units more positive on deservingness relative to the least educated. This finding is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2. 
Finally, in terms of controls, union membership and living in a suburb or big city were 
also statistically significantly associated with more positive deservingness perceptions. Rarely  
attending church is negatively and statistically significantly related to deservingness relative to 
never attending (while frequently attending is not). Female gender and age are not statistically 
significant predictors.     
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Figure 8: Determinants of Deservingness Perceptions 
 
 
Table 4 displays the results of kappa mediation analyses. In Column A, we see that 
overall, the total effects of education on vote choice are strongest for the greens, followed by the 
radical right, and liberals. Educational attainment strongly differentiates who votes for these 
parties: on average, radical right voters have lower educational attainment and green voters have 
high levels of education. Conversely, total education effects are relatively weak among the social 
democrats, and even more so for the radical left and conservatives; in other words, vote choice 
for these parties is not strongly affected by education level. 22 Education effects on voting liberal 
are strong, but the effects are almost entirely direct (Columns B1 and B2); deservingness 
perceptions and welfare state attitudes explain virtually none of the effect of education on voting 
liberal. On balance, this is evidence against Hypotheses 3a and 3b: welfare state attitudes do not 
appear to substantially mediate the effects of education on voting for liberal and conservative 
 
22 The negative sign of some indirect effects for several party families such as the conservatives and radical left is evidence of 
suppression effects, where direct effects of education (controlling for attitudes) are bigger than total effects of education omitting 
attitudes. This means that when comparing low and high educated voters for these party families at a given level of deservingness, 
for example, educational differences in voting become larger. This is not uncommon in kappa mediation analyses (Langsaether 
2019b:6). Since total education effects for these parties are so weak to begin with and kappa estimates have some degree of 
statistical uncertainty, they unlikely to be substantively meaningful.    
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parties, or for radical left parties. Column C2 shows that in the case of social democratic parties, 
welfare state attitudes are a substantial mediator of a fairly weak underlying total educational 
effect.  
However, Column C1 shows that for greens and the radical right, parties which 
exemplify the educational divide in politics, deservingness perceptions explain a substantial 
portion of the education effect on voting (27% and 21% respectively). This is evidence 
consistent with Hypotheses 4a and 4b. This finding is noteworthy, as these are educationally-
distinctive parties whose electoral bases are often understood primarily through the opposition of 
those with low and high levels of education on socio-cultural issues rather than issues of 
redistribution (e.g. Stubager 2010; Dolezal 2010). Overall, this procedure suggests that the 
indirect effect of education on vote choice via deservingness perceptions are generally much 
stronger than those via welfare state support. 
 
 





































Conservatives .096 .144 .111 -.048 -.015 
Social 
Democrats 
.147 .197 .109 -.051 .038 
Radical Right .587 .461 .594 .126 -.007 
Greens .576 .416 .594 .156 -.019 
Radical Left .097 .128 .109 -.031 -.013 





However, there is some evidence that welfare state attitudes as well as deservingness 
perceptions are an important mediator of education effects on vote choice in more fine-grained 
comparisons between adjacent party families competing in political space. To take one 
noteworthy example, there is a fairly strong positive effect of education on the likelihood of 
voting for conservative parties vs. radical right parties.23 Kappa mediation analyses decomposing 
this education effect show that 13% of the total effect of education on voting for radical right 
parties compared to conservative parties is an indirect effect of education via welfare state 
attitudes, compared to about 11% via deservingness perceptions.24 In other words, attitudes 
which are not necessarily mediators of education effects in predicting voting for a given party 
family vs. all other party families can nonetheless be important mediators in education effects on 
voting for party families which contest for specific blocs of voters. Overall, then, evidence 
related to Hypothesis 3a is mixed.   
 
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks   
 
This section addresses four possible concerns regarding the validity of these results. The 
first argument suggests that higher educational attainment is substantially more likely if one’s 
parents are also highly educated and/or from a privileged occupational group. As a result, the 
relationship between education and deservingness perceptions or welfare state attitudes might be 
spurious, if the true cause was parental background. In Appendix 2.3, I control for parental 
 
23 As the growth of radical right party vote shares has challenged the center right has intensified, electoral competition 
between the two has become an area of increasing scholarly focus (Webb and Bale 2014; Pardos-Prado 2015; Abou-
Chadi and Immergut 2019; Gidron and Ziblatt 2019).  
 
24 In analyzing a logistic regression predicting radical right vs. conservative voting, the total effects of education (or 
gross kappa)= .546. The indirect effects of education on vote choice= .071 for welfare state and .051 for deservingness. 
Methodologically, modelling vote choice in this way assumes IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives), but this 
is mathematically equivalent to the standard multinomial logistic regression predicting vote choice, which makes a 
series of logistic comparisons between each party and an omitted reference category (Alvarez and Nagler 1988).   
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educational attainment and for father’s occupation in a model predicting attitudes. The results 
show that education effects on welfare state attitudes and deservingness perceptions shrink by 
about 20%, but education remains a substantial and statistically significant predictor of these 
attitudes after controlling for parental background.  
A second concern relates to the theoretical grounding of the negative relationship 
between education and welfare state support. Some scholars have argued that socialization 
processes occurring within educational institutions themselves are what links higher education to 
opposition to redistribution, rather than the relative insulation of the highly-educated from 
economic risk. In top-down socialization processes, professors can transmit ideas related to the 
efficiency costs of redistribution (Gelepithis and Giani 2020: 11), while in bottom-up 
socialization processes, social networks in universities concentrate disproportionately wealthy 
populations of students who influence each other’s beliefs about meritocracy and inequality 
(Mendelberg et al. 2017; Gelepithis and Giani 2020). If education’s effects on welfare state 
support stemmed from the inculcation of anti-redistributive norms in higher education 
institutions, rather than educational differences in economic risk, then the theorized mechanism 
would change substantially.  
In Appendix 2.4, two predictive models add controls, the first of which more directly 
tests the mechanism of risk, while the second tests the alternative explanation rooted in economic 
ideas imparted through socialization in the university.25 I find that negative education effects on 
welfare state attitudes are weakened by about a quarter when controlling for subjective economic 
 
25 Introducing measures of risk and norms which may follow causally from education has the potential to introduce 
post-treatment bias in the estimates of education effects on redistribution attitudes. This concern about overcontrol is 
the reason such variables are omitted from the analysis up to this point. Their introduction here should be understood 
as comparing alternative causal paths between education and welfare state support, rather than assessing the magnitude 
of education effects.   
51 
 
insecurity, but still remain statistically and substantively significant. The socialization model 
controls for two beliefs that redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses: that social benefits 
and services place too great a strain on business, and place too great a strain on the economy 
generally. Those controls do not weaken the relationship between education and welfare state 
attitudes. Furthermore, while negative education effects on welfare state support are strongest at 
the higher tertiary level, there is virtually no difference between the magnitude of effects at the 
vocational level as opposed to the lower tertiary level, a key theorized site of socialization. While 
not dispositive, this evidence is consistent with the idea that a risk mechanism is in play linking 
education to lower levels of welfare state support and is inconsistent with the idea that the 
negative effect of education on welfare state support is due to the transmission of ideas in 
universities that redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses.       
A third potential concern with this paper’s approach comes from a vibrant emerging 
literature in this field arguing that contemporary redistributive conflict stems not from the 
competing preferences of socio-structural groups for a bigger or smaller welfare state, but instead 
for different types of social spending, particularly for social investment policies vs. social 
consumption policies (e.g. Beramendi et al. 2015; Häusermann et al. 2015; Garritzmann et al. 
2018). On this view, the highly educated are a key support group behind social investment 
policies such as childcare and training designed to facilitate labor market participation, while 
those with lower levels of education instead support passive consumption policies such as 
pension and unemployment benefits. Essentially, this would suggest that the welfare state 
subdimension may be misspecified.  
I lack the space to present full analyses here. However, in Appendix 2.5, I decompose my 
welfare state measure to examine the relationship between education and support for state 
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responsibility in specific policy areas covering both social consumption and social investment. I 
present evidence that education is negatively associated with support for government 
responsibility for maintaining the living standards of the elderly and unemployed, both of which 
fall under social consumption. However, education is also negatively associated with support for 
government responsibility for ensuring sufficient childcare services for working parents, a key 
social investment policy. These results suggest that education is negatively associated with 
preferences for the scope of the welfare state generally, rather than having different effects for 
beliefs about government responsibility in the domains of social investment and social 
consumption.   
Finally, one could argue that estimates of the effects of education both on deservingness 
perceptions and on vote choice, are biased by the omission from the models of other attitudes 
associated with the educational divide, namely socio-cultural positions on immigration and the 
EU (Stubager 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2017). In Appendix 2.6, I include controls for both 
immigration and EU attitudes in both models predicting deservingness perceptions and welfare 
state support and kappa mediation models decomposing direct and indirect effects of education 
on voting. Education effects on both subdimensions of attitudes are robust to these controls, with 
coefficients virtually unchanged for welfare state, and moderately reduced but still statistically 
significant for deservingness. In the kappa mediation models, introducing both immigration and 
EU attitudes as controls decreases the size of the indirect effects of education via deservingness 
perception on both radical right and green voting. However, even after these controls, such 
indirect effects via deservingness perceptions still account for about 13% and 23% of the total 
education effects on both radical right and green voting, respectively.  
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In sum, the effects of education on vote choice via welfare state support and 
deservingness perceptions are robust to several plausible alternative explanations, such as 
parental background, investment or consumption preferences, and socio-cultural attitudes toward 
immigration and the EU. This paper does not claim that attitudes other than the welfare state 
support and deservingness perceptions are irrelevant to educational differences in vote choice. 
Rather, these findings suggest these two redistributive subdimensions are mechanisms linking 




This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it draws on literature in 
sociology and social psychology to argue that education represents a status divide, and not only a 
divide rooted in economic risk or socio-cultural attitudes. Status differentials between those with 
lower and higher levels of education mean they differ in their proclivity to sharply demarcate 
themselves from the needy in order to maintain their own social esteem. While material 
insecurity pushes the lower educated towards support for a more muscular welfare state, status 
insecurity inclines them towards harsher judgments of welfare state beneficiaries. I find that 
higher levels of education are on average associated with more positive attitudes towards the 
deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries compared to less-educated individuals, but are also 
associated with more negative attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state, in keeping with 
the political economy literature.  
Second, I examine to what extent educational divides over redistribution contribute to the 
emergent education cleavage in electoral politics. Less educated voters, who on average see 
welfare state beneficiaries as undeserving, are disproportionately attracted to the radical right; 
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highly educated voters who on average have the most positive perceptions of welfare state 
beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to support green parties. Results of kappa mediation 
analyses suggest these different perceptions of the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries 
explain in part why green and radical right voters represent the poles of the education cleavage.  
Evidence on the role of attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state in mediating 
educational effects on vote choice is more mixed. However, welfare state attitudes are found to 
mediate education effects in a more fine-grained analysis of vote choice between competing 
party families, specifically the radical right and center-right. Differences in attitudes on both the 
welfare state and deservingness subdimensions help to explain why on the Right, the lower 
educated vote disproportionately for radical right parties over conservative parties, potentially 
consistent with research arguing that these voters are characterized more strongly by welfare 
chauvinist attitudes than outright hostility to redistribution (van der Waal et al. 2010).  
In sum, education has typically been understood as a structural divide linked to parties 
primarily competing on the socio-cultural, rather than the economic dimension (Kriesi et al. 
2006; Stubager 2009; Stubager 2010). However, this appears partly to be a function of how 
redistribution attitudes are measured. A deservingness/welfare state framework suggests that the 
educational divide in party politics is also an expression of redistributive conflict, but in a multi-
dimensional way. These results suggest that education is associated with vote choice both 
directly and indirectly, via differences in attitudes not just about the proper scope of the welfare 
state, but even more strongly about the deservingness of welfare state beneficiaries themselves.  
As educationally distinctive radical right and green parties continue to gain ground 
electorally, scholars have begun to focus on their impacts on social policy both in and outside of 
government (Afonso & Rennwald 2018; Abou-Chadi & Immergut 2019; Chueri 2020; Röth and 
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Schwander 2020). This paper helps clarify the contours of redistribution attitudes held by the 
core social support groups of these parties, with consequences for both their welfare state 
agendas and the constraints imposed by the opinions of their voters. With their success in 
attracting a lower education base of voters, radical right parties may risk greater backlash from 
their base for supporting the retrenchment of welfare state programs (Afonso 2015). However, 
the particularly negative perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries in the eyes of their voters may 
give radical right parties leeway to pursue certain kinds of spending cuts if framed around 
punishing benefit cheating by the undeserving (Chueri 2020). Conversely, green parties’ growing 
success among highly educated voters with the most positive views of the needy ties them to an 
electoral base that may be particularly averse to the kinds of negative conditionality frequently 
imposed upon the poor and unemployed.     
To further contextualize and explore these results, more research is needed. When groups 
are cross-pressured across two attitudinal dimensions, the relative salience of each dimension 
becomes crucial for vote choice. Prior research into this question has often focused on how cross 
pressures between socio-cultural and economic attitudes are resolved in vote choice (Lefkofridi 
et al. 2014; Gidron 2020). However, the findings of this paper suggest a new way in which this 
also applies to the alignment of different social groups in redistributive conflicts. Since, on 
average, educational groups take internally conflicted positions in terms of deservingness 
perceptions and welfare state support, future research examining what drives changes in these 
subdimensions’ relative salience over time can help us better understand the evolution of the 











CHAPTER 3: REASSESSING THE “GENDER GAP” IN REDISTRIBUTION 
ATTITUDES: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS (Co-authored with Andreas 






Gender gaps in political behavior have long been a significant object of analysis for 
social scientists. Broadly speaking, scholars in the formative period of this literature in the 1970s 
and 1980s found that women were more politically conservative than men (Shapiro and Mahajan 
1986). However this pattern has reversed in recent decades, with women increasingly more left-
wing, likely to vote for left-wing parties, and more ideologically left-wing relative to male co-
partisans (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Box-Steffensmeyer et al. 2004; Barnes and Cassese 2017). 
Gendered differences in redistribution attitudes have been a particular area of focus, as a core 
dimension of political and party competition (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003; Shorrocks and 
Grasso 2020).  
Two broad schools of thought have motivated scholarly debate about the nature of the 
gender gap created by women’s supportive stance towards redistribution, relative to men. Some 
interpret women’s backing for redistribution as self-interested, in light of the disproportionate 
material insecurity they face (Schwander and Häusermann 2013; Häusermann et al. 2015; 
Häusermann et al. 2016; Shorrocks and Grasso 2020). Others argue women have greater 
empathy for the needy owing to their gendered socialization into caring roles and responsibilities 
(Gilligan 1982; Diekman and Glick 2018; Kamas and Preston 2019). 
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Much of this literature, however, has measured redistribution attitudes on a single 
dimension related to inequality and social spending. Meanwhile, the measurement of 
redistribution attitudes has undergone a substantial transformation, with a variety of innovative 
explorations of their multidimensionality (e.g. Van Oorschot 2000; Cavaillé and Trump 2015; 
Garritzman et al. 2018). Measurement rooted in the separation between self-oriented and other-
oriented attitudes to redistribution allows us to more accurately test extant explanations for the 
gender gap.  
Analyzing 2016 European Social Survey data, we examine the effect of gender both on 
attitudes towards the scope of the welfare state and those about the deservingness of recipients. 
Contrary to expectations of social role theory, we find that female gender is not statistically 
significantly associated with perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries as deserving. Female 
gender is, however, associated with support for an expansive welfare state.  
At most, only a modest amount of this gender gap appears to be a compositional effect of 
women’s greater material insecurity. However, further analyses reveal an interaction effect 
between gender and various measures of economic position. The economically precarious are on 
average supportive of an expansive welfare state regardless of gender, while negative effects of 
economic success on support for the welfare state are significantly weakened for comfortable 
and affluent women relative to their male counterparts. In sum, these tests suggest that while the 
gender gap relates to welfare state preferences rather than forgiving attitudes towards the needy, 
it is not relative material insecurity that drives it. Instead, it is the relative support for the welfare 





Self-Interest or Empathy? Theories of the Gender Gap in Redistribution Attitudes  
 
Cross-nationally, women and female-headed households have lower incomes and are at 
disproportionate risk of poverty. Women are disproportionately employed in lower paying 
occupations than men, are more likely to work in precarious part-time jobs, suffer career 
interruptions and associated income losses due to care responsibilities, and face pay 
discrimination relative to men, even in the same jobs (Misra and Close 2014; Gornick and Boeri 
2016). These disadvantages make the welfare state central for the position of women in society. 
It can not only directly compensate for gendered labor market risk, but also offer work-family 
reconciliation policies that give women more autonomy in their career choices and economic 
independence from male partners (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Orloff 2010). Political 
economists have argued this relative economic precarity underlies women’s relative support for 
redistribution; from the perspective of self-interest, women support redistribution because they 
are net beneficiaries of social programs and services (Schwander & Häusermann 2013; 
Häusermann et al. 2015; Shorrocks & Grasso 2020).  
Social psychological explanations of the gender gap in redistribution instead point to 
gendered differences in socialization leading to different preferences over redistribution (Healy 
and Malhotra 2013). Social role theorists have argued that women are socialized into roles which 
emphasize an “ethic of caring” for the vulnerable, while male roles emphasize individual agency 
(Gilligan 1982; Diekman & Glick 2018). Empirically, both surveys and field experiments in the 
American context have found women to be more compassionate and empathetic towards the 
disadvantaged than men (Eagly et al. 2004; Diekman & Schneider 2010; Blinder & Rolfe 2018; 
Diekman & Glick 2018). 
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Recent advances in the measurement of redistribution attitudes offer the opportunity to 
better test these explanations of the gender gap. While earlier literature focused on preferences 
for a more or less encompassing welfare state, scholars have increasingly argued that 
redistribution attitudes are multidimensional (e.g. Bonoli 2007; Häusermann 2010; Cavaillé & 
Trump 2015; Garritzmann et al. 2018). Of particular interest here is the conceptual distinction 
between self-oriented and other-oriented attitudes to redistribution. In keeping with canonical 
models in political economy which view individuals as self-interested income-maximizers 
(Meltzer & Richard 1981), Cavaillé & Trump (2015) argue that that attitudes about inequality 
and the scope of the welfare state highlight the material benefits and costs associated with 
redistributive programs. In line with this theoretical expectation, they find that responses to 
survey items which tap these attitudes are stratified by income. However, they theorize that 
survey items that solicit evaluations of the worthiness of benefit recipients do not prime 
respondents’ material self-interest, but rather their empathy for and social affinity with the 
needy. Consistent with their theory, Cavaillé & Trump (2015) find that attitudes on this 
subdimension are not stratified by income. This two-dimensional measurement allows us to 
directly test empathetic and self-interest-based explanations for the gender gap.  
First, if the gender gap in redistribution attitudes is driven by empathy, then we should 
expect women to have more positive attitudes about the deservingness of the needy.  
 




If, by contrast, gender differences in redistribution attitudes are driven by self-interest, 
then we should expect women to have higher levels of support for an expansive welfare state 
than men (H2). 
 
H2: on average, female gender is associated with greater support for the welfare state than male 
gender.    
 
 
Data and Methods  
 
The 2016 European Social Survey is an appropriate dataset to test these hypotheses 
because it includes an extensive battery of questions on redistributive preferences and attitudes 
as well as a variety of different measures of economic insecurity across a range of countries. We 
analyze 15 Western European countries26 in order to examine the relationship between gender 
and attitudes towards redistribution, extending comparative coverage beyond studies of the 
gender gap which focus on one or a handful of cases. Below, we explain the operationalization of 
our variables.  
 
Dependent variables: deservingness perceptions and welfare state support 
 
Our dependent variables measure attitudes towards redistribution. Previous cross-national 
research on attitudes towards redistribution often employs a single survey item which asks about 
respondents’ support or opposition to government redistribution of incomes. This is because 
most cross-national survey datasets lack an adequate number of items on attitudes towards 
 
26 Countries included in the analyses are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, 




redistribution which are repeated over multiple survey waves. However, this operationalization is 
both theoretically and empirically problematic if attitudes towards redistribution are multi-
dimensional (Cavaillé & Trump 2015: 146).  
To capture the multidimensional structure of redistribution attitudes, we use principal 
component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation. We retain the two strongest factors, which we 
call deservingness and welfare state, corresponding to Cavaillé & Trump (2015)’s 
“redistribution to” and “redistribution from”, respectively.27 Deservingness explains around 24% 
of the variance and welfare state around 23% of the variance in redistribution attitudes. Both 













27 This paper uses the conceptual labels of deservingness and welfare state because they capture general orientations 
towards welfare state beneficiaries (the unemployed as well as the poor) and the preferences for the scope of 
government social policy. The survey questions used to construct the dependent variables in this paper overlap with 
those used to construct the dimensions of “Redistribution To” and “Redistribution From” in Cavaillé (2014) and 
Cavaille & Trump (2015) from 2008 European Social Survey data, but not all questions from the 2008 survey wave 




Table 5: Rotated Factor Loadings 
Survey Item Deservingness Welfare State 
Government should reduce differences in income levels -.020 .414 
Large differences in income are acceptable to reward 
talents and efforts  
.112 .315 
For a society to be fair, differences in people’s 
standard of living should be small 
.036 .376 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the elderly  
-.086 .478 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the unemployed 
.150 .407 
It should be government’s responsibility to ensure 
sufficient child care services for working parents  
-.073 .418 
Many manage to obtain benefits they are not entitled to .420 -.127 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people lazy 
.525 .057 
Social benefits and services in [respondent’s country] 
make people less willing to care for each other 
.503 .004 
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job .495 -.017 
(Strongest factor loadings in bold) 
 
Questions that best load onto the deservingness component ask survey respondents to judge the 
worthiness of people who receive social benefits and services and the effects of government 
assistance on recipients’ sense of personal and social responsibility.28 Our theoretical framework 
suggests these “other-oriented” items should measure respondents’ empathy with benefit 
recipients. Higher values of deservingness indicate more positive views towards benefit 
recipients. 
 
28 Other research on redistribution attitudes operationalizes deservingness in alternative ways, asking whether certain 
groups deserve more or less money from the welfare state than they currently get (Jeene et al. 2014), whether 
respondents are concerned about a particular group’s living standards and their relative concern for each group in 
relation to others (Van Oorschot 2006), or most directly whether the members of a given group deserve financial 




Questions that load most heavily onto the welfare state component concern attitudes 
towards the scope of government responsibility in social and economic policy and inequality 
reduction. According to our theory, questions of government responsibility should provoke a 
calculation of self-interest, in which respondents ask themselves whether or not they would 
personally benefit from redistribution. Higher values on welfare state indicate support for 
government responsibility for providing social services and lowering inequality.  
 
Independent Variables  
 
Our key independent variable is female gender, whose effects on deservingness and 
welfare state attitudes are the subject of hypotheses H1 and H2. To avoid omitted variable bias in 
our estimation of gender effects, we further include controls for age, religiosity (measured by 
attending religious services), education, union membership, and rural/urban location, which have 
been found to predict support for redistribution.  
 
Modelling Strategy  
 
Since our dependent variables are continuous, we use OLS regression models. We 
include country fixed effects to account for unobserved country-level variation and cluster 
standard errors at the country-level to account for autocorrelation. The first two models predict 
deservingness and welfare state attitudes, respectively, with female gender and a vector of 
controls. The next step will predict welfare state support with female gender and a variety of 
additional controls which measure economic position, to assess the theorized self-interest 
mechanism for this relationship.29     
 
29 A parallel process of mechanism-testing is not necessary for the deservingness-gender relationship, because 





H1 set out the expectation that women will have more positive perceptions of the 
deservingness of the needy because socialized gender roles, defined by care responsibilities, lead 
women to have higher levels of empathy relative to men. Panels A and B of Figure 1 display the 
effects of gender on deservingness perceptions and welfare state attitudes, under controls. On the 
first row of Panel A, the estimated effect of female gender on deservingness attitudes is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. Contrary to the expectations of H1, we do not find 
that women are more empathetic towards the needy than men.  
H2 set out the expectation that women will be more supportive of the welfare state, 
relative to men. On the first row of panel B, we see that the effect of female gender on welfare 
state attitudes is statistically significantly positive (p<.01). On average, female gender is 














Figure 9: Gender Effects on Deservingness and Welfare State 
Panel A (Deservingness) 
 
Panel B  (Welfare State) 
 
                                 Note: models include country fixed-effects (not reported), with standard errors clustered  
  at the country-level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Exploring the Self-Interest Mechanism Linking Gender to Welfare State Support 
 
Overall, these results find that women are significantly more in favor of an expansive 
welfare state relative to men, but do not perceive the needy to be more deserving. However, 
without directly testing the mechanism for the relationship between gender and welfare state 
support, we do not yet have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that differences in economic 
security explain this gender gap. To assess the self-interest mechanism hypothesized to link 
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gender to welfare state support, we use a series of staggered OLS models, beginning with a 
baseline mode predicting welfare state attitudes with gender, controlling only for age, religiosity, 
and urban location. Subsequent models add controls first for objective, and then, subjective 
measures of economic position. The full model includes all predictors. Observing changes from 
the baseline model in the size and significance of the coefficient for gender is the central aim 
here. If self-interest is the primary explanation for women’s greater relative welfare state 
support, then controlling for economic resources should significantly reduce (if not eliminate) 
the effect of gender.   
As we see in Table 6, Models 2 and 3 tell a broadly similar story. Most objective and 
subjective measures of economic (in)security are statistically significantly associated with 
greater welfare state support, in the expected direction.30  Respondents with higher income, those 
who feel secure in their incomes, those who have a job with an unlimited contract (rather than a 
fixed-term contract or no contract) and those who think it is very unlikely they’ll lose their jobs 
on average are less supportive of the welfare state than their more precarious counterparts. In 
sum, there is substantial evidence that economic self-interest conditions support or opposition to 
the welfare state. However, the introduction of these controls, either on their own (in Models 2 
and 3) or all at once (in the Full Model) leads to modest or no reductions in the positive effect of 
female gender on welfare state support. In other words, while self-interest does have substantial 
effects on welfare state attitudes, differences in economic resources between men and women do 
not appear to explain the gender gap in attitudes. 
 
 
30 Part-time employment is not statistically significantly related to welfare state attitudes, while employment status 
itself has somewhat mixed effects in relation to precarity. On average, the sick or disabled have more supportive 




Table 6: Testing The Mechanism for Gender Effects on Welfare State Attitudes 
 Baseline model 
(Gender+controls) 
Model 2 (Objective 
economic security) 
Model 3 (Subjective 
Economic Security) 
Full Model 
Female .13*** (.03) .12**(.03) .13**(.03) .13**(.04) 




X  X  
Student X -.07(.04) X -.04(.05) 
Unemployed X .03(.05) X -.08(.05) 
Discouraged 
unemployed 
X -.19*(.06) X -.30(.05)*** 
Sick or Disabled  X .25***(.04) X .24**(.05) 
Retired X -.02(.03) X -.03(.02) 
Homemaker X .04(.02) X .06(.02)* 
Part-time 
Employment 












X X X  
Coping on 
income 
X X .18***(.01) .13**(.03) 
Difficult on 
income 
X X .32***(.07) .27**(.04) 
Very difficult on 
income 
X X .42***(.04) .36***(.05) 
Subjective job 
insecurity (ref: 




X X X  
Not very likely X X .02(.01) -.00(.02) 
Likely X X .02(.03) -.04(.04) 
Very likely X X .15***(.03) .11*(.05) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Country fixed 
effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 25,158 17,391 20,024 14,441 





Exploring Conditional Effects of Gender on Welfare State Support Across the Economic 
Distribution  
 
Thus far, our results show that gender gap is present on the welfare state subdimension, 
but not the deservingness subdimension. Theoretically, this suggests that gender differences in 
redistribution attitudes are not rooted in empathy for the needy, stemming from socialized gender 
roles. However, our mechanism test yielded no evidence that the significant gender gap in 
welfare state support could be explained by self-interest. That said, a vein of recent literature on 
redistribution attitudes argues that the effects of self-interest on redistribution preferences are 
conditional, rather than operating the same way for all groups of people (Dimick et al. 2016; 
Rueda & Stegmueller 2016; Rueda 2017; Cavaillé 2017; Dimick et al. 2018; Armingeon & 
Weistanner 2021). While multifaceted, these arguments share in common the idea that the 
pressing needs of those at the bottom of the economic distribution make them more likely to 
support redistribution and the parties that promise it regardless of other considerations, while 
there is greater variation in preferences and voting behavior among those in the middle and top 
of the economic distribution.31 This conditionality of self-interest effects may shed light on why 
self-interest seems to significantly affect redistribution attitudes without explaining the gender 
gap.  
Is it the case that gender effects on support for redistribution similarly vary across levels 
of material comfort? To explore further, in Figure 10 we examine the interaction of gender and 
 
31 More specifically, Rueda (2017) argues that parochial altruism plays a greater role in redistributive 
preferences for the rich than the poor. Dimick et al. (2016) find that the redistributive preferences of the 
rich are more sensitive to inequality than the poor, while relatedly, Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) argue 
that the redistributive preferences of the rich are conditioned by crime as an externality of inequality—such 
that rich people living in higher crime areas are more likely to support redistribution. Cavaillé (2017) finds 
that the preferences of those who are reliant on social transfers are less affected than beliefs about free-
riding and abuse of the welfare system relative to those with more comfortable incomes. Finally, Armingeon 
and Weistanner (2021) find that left-right ideology has a stronger effect on redistribution attitudes at the 
middle and top of the income distribution, relative to those at the bottom.   
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income and gender and employment on welfare state support. Panel A shows the marginal effect 
of gender on welfare state support across the household income distribution,32 while Panel B 
displays the marginal effect of gender on welfare state support for the employed versus the 
unemployed. Both show a similar pattern. Gender does not have a statistically significant effect 
on welfare state support for those at the bottom of the income distribution. Instead, gender 
effects emerge and widen among the more affluent, with higher-income men less supportive of 
the welfare state, relative to their more secure female counterparts. Likewise, there are no 
statistically significant gender effects among the unemployed, while employment for men-- but 















32 Ideally, we would prefer to analyze individual rather than household income. Unfortunately, the ESS has no 
individual measures of income.   
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Figure 10: Gender Effects on Welfare State Support Across the Economic Spectrum 
 
Panel A: Effects by Income 
 
Panel B: Effects by Employment 
 
                                                                      
Discussion  
 
Two different theoretical explanations for the gender gap are rooted in economic self-
interest, and gendered empathy. Breaking down redistribution attitudes into welfare state support 
and deservingness perceptions gives us additional analytical leverage on the debate over the 
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gender gap in redistribution attitudes. This multidimensional framework both offers us more 
precise information on the substance of gender gap in redistribution attitudes, and allows us to 
adjudicate between self-interested and other-oriented explanations.   
We find no evidence that there are gendered differences in empathy for the needy, in 
contrast to the expectations of social role theory. Instead, women are more supportive than men 
of an expansive welfare state. Next, we test the mechanism for the gender gap theorized by 
political economists by adding controls for objective and subjective economic security. 
Introducing these controls has little to no effect on the size of the gender gap in welfare state 
support. This suggests gender effects on redistribution attitudes are not simply compositional; 
women are not more supportive of redistribution than men simply because they are more 
economically precarious on average.  
Subsequent analyses took inspiration from an emerging vein of literature on 
redistribution attitudes. The core insight of these works is that the effects of self-interest on 
attitudes towards redistribution are conditional—with less extreme material need, there is greater 
variation among those in the middle and higher economic strata. In a similar vein, we find that 
strength of the link between economic position and support for the welfare state varies between 
men and women—but only for those in relatively comfortable economic positions. Men’s 
attitudes towards the welfare state, significantly more than those of women, become sharply 
negative in the middle and upper ends of the economic distribution.  
These conditional effects of gender across the income distribution likely help to explain 
why a battery of controls for economic position do not shrink the gender gap in welfare state 
support in our initial analyses. However, this still leaves open the question of why gender effects 
on welfare state attitudes exist at the middle and top of the economic spectrum. At this stage, a 
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full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper and must be taken up in future 
research.  
One possible response is that women’s redistribution attitudes are sensitive to relative 
income compared to male partners, which affects women’s bargaining power within the 
household. Alper (2019)’s cross-national study finds that women at the middle and higher 
reaches of the household income distribution have the biggest relative income gaps, and thus 
power differentials, with their male partners. Sensitivity to relative income differences within the 
household could explain sharp gender differences in welfare state support, but testing this would 
require more detailed data which decomposes economic resources held by men and women 
within shared households.33 Another possibility is that gender differences are shaped by existing 
national welfare state, family policy, or growth regimes, which shape both the social risks and 
supports of men and women, and, in turn, their attitudes. Future research should employ 
multilevel models or cluster analysis to analyze the mechanisms linking gender differences in 

















33 Surprisingly (in analysis not presented here for space reasons), introducing controls for marital status and children 
living in the household similarly had no detectable effect on the gender gap in welfare state support.  
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APPENDIX 1.1: PARTY FAMILY CODINGS 
 
 
Party family codings were derived by triangulating between codings from the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015), ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019), and author’s own 
judgment. Parties are listed by party family, and within party families alphabetically by country 
and party name. Parties falling under the party family category “Other” were a mix of single-
issue parties, regionalist parties, confessional parties and when ESS respondents reported voting 
for an unspecified “other party” or “independents.” Results for voters of these parties were not 
reported both for parsimony’s sake and because I lack strong theoretical expectations for the 
educational or ideological profile of said voters in terms of welfare state attitudes or 















Table 7: List of Parties by Party Family and Country 
Party Family Party Name Country 
Conservatives Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) Austria 
Conservatives Christian People's Party /Christian Democratic 
and Flemish Party (CVP/CD&V) 
Belgium 
Conservatives Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) Belgium 
Conservatives  People’s Party (PP) Belgium 
Conservatives Finnish Christian League (SKL/KD) Finland 
Conservatives National Coalition Party (KOK) Finland 
Conservatives Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)  France 
Conservatives Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Germany 
Conservatives Fianna Fáil (FF) Ireland 
Conservatives Fine Gael (FG) Ireland 
Conservatives Future and Freedom (FLI) Italy 
Conservatives People of Liberty (PdL) Italy 
Conservatives The Right (La Destra) Italy 
Conservatives Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) Netherlands 
Conservatives Christian Union (CU) Netherlands 
Conservatives  Reformed Political Party (SGP) Netherlands  
Conservatives Christian Democratic Party (KrF) Norway 
Conservatives Conservative Party (H) Norway 
Conservatives Democratic and Social Center/People's Party 
(CDS/PP) 
Portugal 
Conservatives Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) Spain 
Conservatives Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT) Spain 
Conservatives People's Party (PP) Spain 
Conservatives Moderate Party (M) Sweden 
Conservatives Christian Democrats (KD) Sweden 
Conservatives Christian Social Party/Humanist Democratic 
Centre (PSC/CDH) 
Switzerland 
Conservatives Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland 
(BDP) 
Switzerland 
Conservatives Conservative People's Party (CVP-PDC) Switzerland 
Conservatives Protestant People's Party (EVP-PEP) Switzerland 














Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family and Country 
Social Democrats Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) Austria 
Social Democrats Socialist Party (PS) Belgium 
Social Democrats Socialist Party (SP/SPA) Belgium 
Social Democrats Social Democratic Party of Finland (SPD) Finland 
Social Democrats Socialist Party (PS) France 
Social Democrats Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) Germany 
Social Democrats Labour (LAB) Ireland 
Social Democrats Democratic Party (PD) Italy 
Social Democrats Left Ecology and Liberty (SEL) Italy 
Social Democrats Labour Party (PvdA) Netherlands 
Social Democrats Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) Norway 
Social Democrats Socialist Party (PS) Portugal 
Social Democrats Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) Spain 
Social Democrats Workers Party- Social Democrats (SAP) Sweden 
Social Democrats Social Democratic Party of Switzerland Switzerland 
Social Democrats Labour Party (Lab) United Kingdom 
Radical Left Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) Austria 
Radical Left Workers Party of Belgium (PVDA+/PTB) Belgium 
Radical Left The Left (LINKE)  Germany 
Radical Left Left Alliance (VAS) Finland 
Radical Left Left Front (FdG) France 
Radical Left New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA) France 
Radical Left Workers’ Struggle (LO) France 
Radical Left Anti-Austerity Alliance (AAA) Ireland 
Radical Left Sínn Fein (SF) Ireland 
Radical Left Civil Revolution  Italy 
Radical Left Socialist Party (SP) Netherlands 
Radical Left Socialist Left Party (SV) Norway 
Radical Left The Red Party (Rødt) Norway 
Radical Left Left Bloc (BE) Portugal 
Radical Left Unitary Democratic Coalition (PCP-PEV) Portugal 
Radical Left Unidos Podemos  Spain 
Radical Left Left Party (V) Sweden 














Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family 
Radical Right Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB) Belgium 
Radical Right Danish People’s Party (DF) Denmark 
Radical Right Alternative For Germany (AfD) Germany 
Radical Right National Front (FN) France 
Radical Right Movement for France (MPF) France 
Radical Right National Alliance (AN) Italy 
Radical Right Northern League (LN) Italy 
Radical Right Party for Freedom (PVV) Netherlands 
Radical Right UK Independence Party (UKIP) United Kingdom  
Radical Right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) Austria 
Radical Right Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) Austria 
Radical Right True Finns (PS) Finland 
Radical Right Sweden Democrats (SD) Sweden 
Radical Right Progress Party (Fr) Norway 
Radical Right Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC) Switzerland 
Greens The Austrian Green Party (Grüne) Austria 
Greens AGALEV/Green! Belgium 
Greens Ecolo Belgium 
Greens Green League (VIHR) Finland 
Greens Green Party (VERTS) France 
Greens Alliance 90/The Greens Germany 
Greens Green Party (GP) Ireland 
Greens GreenLeft (GL) Netherlands 
Greens Party for the Animals (PvdD) Netherlands 
Greens Green Party (MDG) Norway 
Greens Environment Party- The Greens (MP) Sweden 
Greens Greens (Grüne) Switzerland 
Greens Green Liberals (GPL-PVL) Switzerland 
















Appendix 1.1, Continued: List of Parties by Party Family  
 
Liberals Liberal Forum/New Austria and Liberal Forum 
(NEOS) 
Austria 
Liberals Team Stronach  Austria 
Liberals Liberal Reformist Party (PRL/MR) Belgium 
Liberals Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) Belgium 
Liberals Centre Party (KESK) Finland 
Liberals New Centre (NC) France 
Liberals Union for French Democracy (UDF/MODEM) France 
Liberals Free Democratic Party (FDP) Germany 
Liberals Civic Choice (SC) Italy 
Liberals Union of the Center (UDC) Italy 
Liberals Citizens (Cs) Spain 
Liberals Democrats 66 (D66) Netherlands 
Liberals People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 
(VVD) 
Netherlands 
Liberals Centre Party (SP) Norway 
Liberals Venstre (V) Norway 
Liberals Centre Party (C) Sweden 
Liberals Liberal People's Party (FP) Sweden 
Liberals FDP. The Liberals (FDP/PLR) Switzerland 


























APPENDIX 1.2: FULL MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
The following tables report multinomial logistic regression results including controls not 
reported in Table 2 (page 19). Multinomial logistic regression imposes a comparison with an 
omitted base outcome. In this case, the omitted category is voting for a conservative party. 
Coefficients thus represent effects of a given independent variable on the probability of voting 
for a certain party family relative to voting for a conservative party. Because the multinomial 
logistic regression is all one model, accompanying model fit statistics and other information can 































Table 8a: Predicting Social Democratic Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting) 
Independent Variable    Coefficient (S.E) 
Deservingness .37***(.03) 
Welfare State  .47*** (.09) 
 
Income -.02(.02) 
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .03(.11) 
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary  -.01(.14) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.30(.21) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary   -.13(.18) 
Advanced Vocational -.31(.21) 
Lower Tertiary  -.26(.25) 
Higher Tertiary -.16(.27) 
Occupational Class (reference category: 
Technical Semi-Professional) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals & Large 
Employers 
-.28(.32) 
Small Business Owners -.52*(.22) 
Production Workers  .03(.14) 
Associate Managers -.26*(.10) 
Clerks  -.11(.12) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals -.06(.15) 
Service Workers .25(.15) 
Union .48***(.07) 
Urban (reference category: rural)  
Town .29***(.07) 
Suburbs .52***(.13) 
Big City  .77***(.16) 
Attend Services (reference category: never)  
Rarely -.47***(.08) 
At least once a week -.87**(.32) 















Table 8b: Predicting Radical Right Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting) 
Independent Variable    Coefficient (S.E) 
Deservingness -.26***(.06) 
Welfare State  .33***(.08) 
 
Income .00(.04) 
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .41*(.16) 
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary  .18(.14) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary .19(.24) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary   -.05(.23) 
Advanced Vocational -.42*(.19) 
Lower Tertiary  -.37(.42) 
Higher Tertiary -.69(.41) 
Occupational Class (reference category: 
Technical Semi-Professional) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals & Large 
Employers 
-.06(.15) 
Small Business Owners -.21(.28) 
Production Workers  .57**(.19) 
Associate Managers -.26*(.10) 
Clerks  -.34(.26) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals -.68*(.27) 
Service Workers .40(.23) 
Union .49***(.08) 
Urban (reference category: rural)  
Town .28***(.07) 
Suburbs .52***(.13) 
Big City  .81***(.15) 
Attend Services (reference category: never)  
Rarely -.44***(.06) 
At least once a week -.82***(.31) 















Table 8c: Predicting Green Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting) 
Independent Variable    Coefficient (S.E) 
Deservingness .75***(.08) 
Welfare State  .39***(.07) 
 
Income -.01*(.04) 
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .25**(.08) 
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary  .88(.50) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary .91*(.43) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary   1.49**(.49) 
Advanced Vocational 1.44**(.45) 
Lower Tertiary  1.64***(.40) 
Higher Tertiary 1.59***(.42) 
Occupational Class (reference category: 
Technical Semi-Professional) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals & Large 
Employers 
-.09(.51) 
Small Business Owners -.23(.45) 
Production Workers  .12(.36) 
Associate Managers -.59***(.16) 
Clerks  -.28(.16) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals .06(.15) 
Service Workers .08(.16) 
Union .44**(.13) 
Urban (reference category: rural)  
Town .49***(.19) 
Suburbs .47**(.14) 
Big City  .84***(.29) 
Attend Services (reference category: never)  
Rarely -.50***(.06) 
At least once a week -.74*(.34) 















Table 8d: Predicting Radical Left Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting) 
Independent Variable    Coefficient (S.E) 
Deservingness .68***(.04) 
Welfare State  .73***(.06) 
 
Income -.06(.05) 
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .26*(.12) 
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary  .06(.17) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.29(.21) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary   -.15(.18) 
Advanced Vocational -.31(.21) 
Lower Tertiary  -.27(.25) 
Higher Tertiary -.20(.26) 
Occupational Class (reference category: 
Technical Semi-Professional) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals & Large 
Employers 
-1.00**(.37) 
Small Business Owners -.26(.27) 
Production Workers  .16(.17) 
Associate Managers -.58***(.16) 
Clerks  -.53(.30) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals .05(.22) 
Service Workers .23(.21) 
Union .84***(.12) 
Urban (reference category: rural)  
Town .35(.23) 
Suburbs .48**(.15) 
Big City  .91***(.21) 
Attend Services (reference category: never)  
Rarely -.98***(.13) 
At least once a week -1.84***(.22) 















Table 8e: Predicting Liberal Voting (Relative to Conservative Voting) 
Independent Variable    Coefficient (S.E) 
Deservingness .22(.13) 
Welfare State  .14(.11) 
 
Income .03(.02) 
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .03(.17) 
Education (reference category: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary  .35(.35) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary .42(.23) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary   .40(.28) 
Advanced Vocational .39(.29) 
Lower Tertiary  1.07**(.36) 
Higher Tertiary 1.26**(.46) 
Occupational Class (reference category: 
Technical Semi-Professional) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals & Large 
Employers 
-.46(.29) 
Small Business Owners -.35(.20) 
Production Workers  -.10(.25) 
Associate Managers -.27(.16) 
Clerks  -.18(.19) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals -.16(.22) 
Service Workers -.03(.21) 
Union .37*(.15) 
Urban (reference category: rural)  
Town .15(.12) 
Suburbs .23(.25) 
Big City  .30(.22) 
Attend Services (reference category: never)  
Rarely -.33(.08) 
At least once a week -.74*(.30) 
Female  .03(.19) 
Age -.00(.00) 
N=12,105, R2=.19. Note: Country Fixed Effects (Not Reported), SEs Clustered at Country-
Level. 














Countries differ in the constellation of parties which voters may choose between. As a 
robustness check to ensure this variation in choice sets is not biasing my results, I present below 
multinomial logistic regression results for the ten countries which contain all party families. 
These are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden. I once again use the full battery of controls and country fixed effects. 
Since the results are substantively unchanged, however, I report here only the coefficients for the 
key independent variables of interest (deservingness and welfare state) across party families. Full 
results including controls are available from the author upon request.   
 
Table 9: Deservingness and Welfare State Effects on Vote Choice, Restricted Country 
Sample 
 Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) 
Party Family Deservingness Welfare State 
Conservative (Base Outcome) N/A N/A 
Social Democratic .41***(.05) .42***(.08) 
Radical Right -.24**(.08) .36**(.13) 
Green .70***(.07) .35***(.08) 
Radical Left .75***(.05) .72***(.07) 
Liberal .12(.11) -.07(.10) 
N=8,520, R2=.18 Note: Country Fixed Effects (Not Reported), SEs Clustered At Country-Level. 















APPENDIX 1.4: PREDICTING VOTING FOR TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE 




Below are predicted probabilities for voting green and radical right across the range of 
deservingness and welfare state attitudes, controlling for EU and immigration attitudes and the 
original battery of controls. These are derived from multinomial logistic regression with voting 
conservative as the omitted base outcome, with country fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at the country level. As we see, positive deservingness perceptions remain strongly 
associated with a higher predicted probability of voting green and a lower predicted probability 
of voting radical right. This holds even controlling for potential confounding variables, including 
attitudes towards immigration and European integration.     
 
Figure 11: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Green and Radical Right, Controlling for EU 















APPENDIX 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. 
Deviation 
Deservingness 0 -2.80 2.87 1 
Welfare State 0 -5.12 2.33 1 





Age 50.66 18 100 18.02 
Female .51 0  1 .5 
Attend Services .54 0 (Never) 2 (Weekly) .72 
Union .40 0 1  .49 
Rural/Urban 1.03 0 (Farm or 
country village) 
3 (big city) 1.06 
Immigration 
Attitudes 
5.25 0 10 2.36 
EU Attitudes 4.91 0 10 2.65 





































APPENDIX 2.2: CONSTRUCTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variables Deservingness and Welfare State are constructed using principal 
component analysis (PCA), which forms a weighted scale based on latent dimensions found in the 
data. All variables beginning with “new” are reverse codings of the original ESS question, such 
that higher values indicate support for redistribution. The questions used to construct the two 
dependent variables are as follows:   
 
Sblazy: “And to what extent to you agree/disagree that social/benefits and services make people 
lazy?” 
1- Agree Strongly  
2- Agree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Disagree 
5- Disagree Strongly 
 
Bennent: “Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled” 
1- Agree Strongly  
2- Agree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Disagree 
5- Disagree Strongly 
 
Sblwcoa: “And to what extent to you agree/disagree that social/benefits and services make people 
less willing to care for one another?” 
1- Agree Strongly  
2- Agree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Disagree 
5- Disagree Strongly 
 
Uentrjb: “Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job” 
1- Agree Strongly  
2- Agree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Disagree 
5- Disagree Strongly 
 
Newgincdif: “Government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”  
1- Disagree Strongly  
2- Disagree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Agree 





Gvslvol*: “Should it be government’s responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for 
the old?” 




10- Should be entirely government’s responsibility  
 
Gvslvue: “Should it be government’s responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for 
the unemployed?” 




10- Should be entirely government’s responsibility  
 
Gvcldcr: “Should it be government’s responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for 
working parents?” 




10- Should be entirely government’s responsibility  
 
Dfincac: “Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in 
talents and efforts” 
1- Agree Strongly  
2- Agree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Disagree 
5- Disagree Strongly 
 
Newsmdfslv: “For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small.” 
1- Disagree Strongly  
2- Disagree 
3- Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4- Agree 











APPENDIX 2.3: ASSESSING EDUCATION EFFECTS ON DESRVINGNESS AND 
WELFARE STATE ATTITUDES, CONTROLLING FOR PARENTAL EDUCATION 
AND FATHER’S OCCUPATION 
 
 
Since parental education and occupation are predictors of an individual’s own 
educational attainment, there may be concerns that the effects of an individual’s educational 
attainment on their redistribution attitudes may be spurious. To control for this, I operationalize 
parental education as the educational attainment of either the respondent’s father or mother, 
whichever is highest. This uses the same ISCED measurement schema used to code individual 
educational attainment. Since occupational categories are not strictly ordinal, I am unable to take 
the highest parental occupation or average mother’s and father’s occupation; I thus 




























Table 11: Predicting Welfare State, Controlling for Parental Education and Father’s 
Occupation 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) 
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary -.06 (.05) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.16* (.06) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary .17* (.06) 
Advanced Vocational -.25** (.06) 
Lower Tertiary  -.22*(.06) 
Upper Tertiary  -.28**(.09) 
Parental Ed (ref.: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary -.03(.05) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.11**(.04) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary -.05(.05) 
Advanced Vocational .04(.04) 
Lower Tertiary  -.03(.06) 
Upper Tertiary  -.06(.05) 
Father’s Occupation 
(ref.:Professional and Technical) 
 




Skilled Worker .02(.04) 
Semi-skilled Worker .09(.05) 
Unskilled Worker .11*(.04) 
Farm Worker .00(.05) 
Age .00(.00) 
Female .16***(.03) 
Attend Services (ref.: never)  
Rarely -.10**(.03) 
At least once/week  -.15**(.04) 
Union .21***(.03) 
Urban (ref: rural)  
Town .06*(.02) 
Suburbs .02(.05) 
Big City  .16**(.05) 
R2 .15 
N 19,887 
Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not  









Table 12: Predicting Deservingness, Controlling for Parental Education and Father’s 
Occupation 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) 
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary .11(.09) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.02(.09) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary .25*(.09) 
Advanced Vocational .23(.12) 
Lower Tertiary  .47**(.11) 
Upper Tertiary  .57**(.15) 
Parental Ed (ref.: <Lower Sec.)  
Lower Secondary -.03(.03) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.03(.05) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary -.04(.04) 
Advanced Vocational .01(.03) 
Lower Tertiary  -.03(.06) 
Upper Tertiary  -.07(.03) 
Father’s Occupation 
(ref.:Professional and Technical) 
 




Skilled Worker -.11*(.04) 
Semi-skilled Worker -.13*(.06) 
Unskilled Worker -.07(.05) 
Farm Worker -.13*(.04) 
Age .00(.00) 
Female .01(.02) 
Attend Services (ref.: never)  
Rarely -.09*(.03) 
At least once/week  -.11**(.05) 
Union .13***(.05) 
Urban (ref: rural)  
Town .03(.03) 
Suburbs .13***(.03) 
Big City  .22***(.02) 
R2 .11 
N 19,887 
Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not  









APPENDIX 2.4: ASSESSING EDUCATION EFFECTS ON WELFARE STATE 
ATTITUDES, CONTROLLING FOR RISK AND VALUES 
 
 
In Table 13, one model adds controls for economic risk, and the other for the anti-
redistributive values theorized by some scholars to be imparted through socialization in 
university—namely, that the inefficiency of redistribution leads to aggregate welfare losses 
(Gelepithis and Giani 2020: 11). The socialization model controls for the belief that social 
benefits and services place too great a strain on business and on the economy generally. These 
are operationalized in Business_Strain  and Econ_Strain, variables ranging from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree with the statements “social benefits and services cost businesses too much in 
taxes” and “social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy”, respectively. 
Strongly Agree is used as the reference category for both variables. Those controls do not 
weaken the relationship between education and welfare state attitudes, notably including at the 
lower and higher tertiary levels.  
 
Subjective economic insecurity is a binary measure assigning respondents a 1 if they report being 
either a) somewhat or very worried about losing their job or b) having a difficult or very difficult 
time coping on their income, and a 0 if they do not report either job or financial insecurity. I find 
that negative education effects on welfare state attitudes are weakened by about a quarter when 
controlling for subjective economic insecurity, but still remain statistically and substantively 
significant. This is not a definitive test, but offers some evidence that economic risk is an 






Table 13: Predicting Welfare State, Controlling for Anti-Redistributive Values and 
Subjective Economic Risk 
 
 Model 1 (Incl. Values) Model 2 (Risk) 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) 
Education (ref.: <Lower Sec.)   
Lower Secondary -.07**(.02) -.05(.04) 
Lower Tier Upper Secondary -.16**(.04) -.12(.06) 
Upper Tier Upper Secondary -.22***(.03) -.11*(.05) 
Advanced Vocational -.31***(.03) -.21***(.04) 
Lower Tertiary  -.32***(.04) -.20**(.05) 
Upper Tertiary  -.41***(.05) -.25***(.04) 
Econ_Strain (ref: Strongly 
Agree) 
  
Agree .02(.06)  
Neither agree nor disagree .08(.08)  
Disagree .24*(.10)  
Strongly disagree .55***(.07)  
Business_Strain (ref: Strongly 
Agree) 
  
Agree .05(.06)  
Neither agree nor disagree .09(.06)  
Disagree .25**(.08)  
Strongly disagree .57***(.08)  
Subjective Economic Insecurity  .21***(.04) 
Age .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Female .14***(.03) .14***(.03) 
Attend Services (ref.: never)   
Rarely -.06*(.02) -.11***(.02) 
At least once/week  -.11**(.03) -.15**(.04) 
Union .16***(.01) .22***(.02) 
Urban (ref: rural)   
Town .03(.02) .04(.02) 
Suburbs .00(.04) .01(.05) 
Big City  .09(.04) .14*(.05) 
R2 .19 .15 
N 23, 386 20,532 
Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not  








APPENDIX 2.5: REANALYZING THE WELFARE STATE MEASURE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT VS. SOCIAL CONSUMPTION  
 
 
Table 14 decomposes the welfare state dimension to test whether education effects differ 
according to policy areas related to social consumption and social investment. The first two 
dependent variables register support for social consumption: support for government responsibility 
to ensure a decent standard of living for the elderly, and for the unemployed. The third is a key 
policy domain of social investment: government responsibility to provide child care services for 
working parents. All three variables range from “not government’s responsibility at all” (0) to 
“entirely government’s responsibility” (10).  
Education effects are not monotonic in every case, and certain educational categories are 
not statistically significant, as with the effect of an upper tertiary education on supporting 
government responsibility for the unemployed, or the effect of a lower tertiary education on 
government responsibility for childcare. This may be due partly to the fact that responses to 
individual survey items are generally less reliable than multi-item scales (Ansolabehere et al. 
2008).  
That said, the overall pattern is consistent with the main results of the paper with respect 
to welfare state: education is negatively associated with support for government responsibility over 
social policy. Notably, this pattern is consistent across social consumption policy domains as well 
as social investment policy domains. The strongest negative education effect on support for 
government responsibility in childcare, for example, is found for tertiary education.  
The literature on social support coalitions for social investment and social consumption 
finds that the less educated support passive consumption policy, while the highly educated support 
active social investment policy (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Garritzmann et al. 2018). The 
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findings of this Appendix should not be overinterpreted as a challenge to this literature. This work 
generally centers around priorities for different types of social spending under conditions of fiscal 
constraint, rather than support for state responsibility over social policy areas in the abstract. For 
the purposes of this paper, however, this evidence suggests that the negative effect of education 
on welfare state support is consistent across policy domains. 
 
Table 14: Decomposing the Welfare State Dimension 
 DV 1: Gov’t 
Responsibility for 
Elderly’s Std. of Living  
DV 2: Gov’t 
Responsibility for 
Unemployed Std. of 
Living 
DV 3: Gov’t 
Responsibility for 
Childcare 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) 
Education (ref.: <Lower 
Sec.) 
   
Lower Secondary -.12**(.03) -.14(.08) -.21**(.06) 
Lower Tier Upper 
Secondary 
-.18*(.08) -.48***(.09) -.18*(.08) 
Upper Tier Upper 
Secondary 
-.29***(.05) -.26**(.06) -.26*(.09) 
Advanced Vocational -.36***(.06) -.41**(.10) -.27*(.09) 
Lower Tertiary  -.38***(.04) -.25**(.07) -.22(.12) 
Upper Tertiary  -.62***(.11) -.23(.11) -.28*(.11) 
Age .00(.00) .00(.00) -.01*(.00) 
Female .08*(.03) .14***(.03) .25***(.05) 
Attend Services (ref.: 
never) 
   
Rarely -.06*(.02) -.11***(.02) -.05(.03) 
At least once/week  -.11**(.03) -.15**(.04) -.25***(.05) 
Union .23***(.04) .22***(.02) .24***(.05) 
Urban (ref: rural)    
Town .04(.04) .04(.02) .10(.08) 
Suburbs -.03(.09) .01(.05) .08(.09) 
Big City  .12(.08) .14*(.05) .18***(.04) 
R2 .06 .15 .10 
N 27, 006 20,532 26,836 
Note: table entries are OLS regression coefficients with country fixed effects (not  







APPENDIX 2.6: CALCULATING INDIRECT EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON VOTE 
CHOICE VIA DESERVINGNESS AND WELFARE STATE ATTITUDES, 
CONTROLLING FOR IMMIGRATION AND EU ATTITUDES 
 
 
Immigration and EU attitudes are often seen as paramount to the educational divide in 
electoral politics. Since both types of attitudes can result causally from education, adding them as 
controls risks creating post-treatment bias. However, with this in mind, a robustness check 
controlling for these attitudes can allay concerns around omitted variable bias. The resulting test 
should be considered a conservative one; rather than trying to generate a precise estimate of 
education effects, this test gives us a sense of the effect of education on vote choice via 
deservingness and welfare state, after controlling for socio-cultural attitudes.  
Here immigration attitudes is operationalized with a measure which asks respondents on 
a 0-10 scale whether they think immigrants are bad (0) or good (10) for their country. EU 
Attitudes are operationalized with a measure which asks respondents on a 0-10 scale whether 
they think European unification has gone too far (0) or not far enough (10). Tables 15 and 16 
repeat the kappa mediation analyses to test the robustness of indirect effects of education on vote 
choice via deservingness and welfare state, controlling for immigration and EU attitudes. Table 
15 shows that the core finding of the paper’s earlier mediation analysis is robust to the inclusion 
of controls for EU and immigration attitudes; a substantial portion of the effects of education on 
voting for green and radical right parties is indirect via deservingness perceptions. In Table 16, 
we also see that, controlling for EU and immigration attitudes, indirect effects of education on 
vote choice appear for social democratic and liberal parties.    
In the case of social democratic, radical left, and conservative parties, the direct effects of 
education on voting sometimes paradoxically appear somewhat bigger than the total effects of 
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education on voting, depending on the attitudinal control. In part, this is likely because the kappa 
estimates have some level of statistical uncertainty, and the total education effects for these 
parties are weak.  
It is also possible that there is a suppression effect;34 since education is correlated with 
immigration attitudes, the initial logistic regression predicting voting (before introducing 
attitudes) could be understating the effect of education. This would explain why the direct 
education effect estimated after controlling for immigration attitudes would appear stronger than 
the total education effect.   
 
 
Table 15: Direct & Indirect Effects of Education on Voting (via Deservingness), Controlling 
for Immigration and EU Attitudes 
Family Total Effect of 
Education on 
Vote 
Direct Effect of 
Education on 
Vote 




Conservatives .122 .167 -.045 
Social Democrats .218 .244 -.026 
Radical Right .350 .311 .039 
Greens .427 .346 .081 
Radical Left .085 .154 -.069 














34 Correspondence with Peter E. Langsaether, May 2020.  
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Table 16: Direct & Indirect Effects of Education on Voting (via Welfare State), Controlling 
for Immigration and EU Attitudes 
Family Total Effect of 
Education on 
Vote 
Direct Effect of 
Education on 
Vote 




Conservatives .122 .096 .026 
Social Democrats .218 .175 .043 
Radical Right .350 .348 .002 
Greens .427 .448 -.021 
Radical Left .085 .085 .000 
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